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ABSTRACT
The battle of Kursk in the summer of 1943 was a pivotal battle of World War II. The
defeat at Kursk placed the Wehrmacht on the permanent strategic defensive on the Eastern Front.
The opening of the Soviet archives after 1989 has permitted more thorough analysis of that battle
and produced greater appreciation of the Red Army’s performance, while casting doubt on the
notion that the Germans were close to an operational victory.
Preceding the clash, both sides prepared feverishly, attempting to bring the units involved
to their maximum capability by replacing personnel, upgrading equipment, and conducting
training. The Germans delayed the attack several times to deploy the new armored vehicles.
Soviet leaders gathered intelligence from their own sources as well as from ULTRA, which was
the codename for British intelligence gained from the German Enigma machine. The Soviets, in
anticipation of the onslaught, built a massive and intricate defense.
Kursk began on July 4, 1943 with a German attack in the south to gain observation for
artillery. The main battle began on July 5 when the Germans attacked both shoulders of the
Kursk salient. The fighting was furious. In the north the frontlines quickly stabilized, but in the
south German forces made progress. The critical moment occurred when they reached the
village of Prokhorovka on July 12. The II SS Panzer Corps and the Soviet Fifth Guards Tank
and Fifth Guards Armies fought to a tactical draw with hundreds of tanks lost on both sides.
However, the Allied invasion of Sicily prompted Hitler to transfer panzer divisions from Kursk
to the Mediterranean Theater, thus seriously reducing the assets available to Field Marshal Erich
von Manstein, the commander of the German units in the south. This decision essentially ended
the Battle of Kursk.

iv

Had Hitler given his subordinates more freedom to destroy the Soviet armored reserves,
they might have mitigated the catastrophe. But the Germans at Kursk could not have achieved
victory. It was a simple matter of the Soviets outnumbering the Germans in all categories, and
the Red Army had improved its capabilities to the point it could execute devastating deep,
combined arms operations against the Wehrmacht.

v

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The largest tank engagement of World War Two occurred near the small town of
Prokhorovka in the Ukraine in July 1943. This engagement was the culminating point of the
German summer offensive codenamed Operation CITADEL. CITADEL's mission was to
encircle the Red Army forces that were in the Kursk salient, which was a large area of Soviet
controlled territory that thrust into German-held territory. In this region the front lines were not
straight but curved, and this curvature provided both sides with opportunities to launch an
offensive as well as defensive liabilities.
The Germans started the Battle of Kursk on July 4, 1943 on the southern half of the
Kursk salient, but this was merely to gain better artillery observation points. The battle began in
earnest early in the morning of July 5, when the Soviets conducted an artillery barrage before the
Wehrmacht attacked. The Germans countered with their own planned barrages shortly thereafter
and seized the initiative on both fronts. Their attacking forces met heavy resistance from the
onset. The Red Army defenses were immense as it had months to prepare them. German
infantry and armor continued to bludgeon their way towards the city of Kursk but forward
progress was slow. The German northern wing slowed to a standstill, while the southern wing
continued to make progress.
The fight on the German southern wing culminated with the battle of Prokhorovka on
July 12. This action was a meeting engagement, which is a battle where both combatants are
moving offensively and unexpectedly meet. The Soviet Fifth Guards Tank Army, which was
advancing to the west, and the German II SS Panzer Corps, which was attempting to
breakthrough to the northeast, were Prokhorovka’s principle participants. This conflict was the
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largest tank battle of World War Two. The result was a tactical draw, but Hitler called off the
attack due to events in other theaters. From this point on Germany found itself on the strategic
defensive, while Moscow began an offensive push that would culminate in the seizure of Berlin.
Most historians acknowledge Kursk as the swan song of German armored warfare. There
are three reasons for this shared notion. The first is that CITADEL was the last time the
Germans held the strategic initiative on the Eastern Front. Secondly, Soviet diplomats no longer
demanded a second front from their Anglo-American Allies with the same vehemence as they
had prior to the Battle of Kursk. Finally, the German panzer divisions never regained the
relative or absolute strength they had enjoyed before the Battle of Kursk. Aside from this,
historical interpretations of Kursk diverge sharply.
The interpretations of the Battle of Kursk fall into five schools of thought: the German,
the Soviet, the Western prior to Ultra declassification, the modern mainstream, and the modern
revisionist. Those who fought on the Eastern Front or were either ardent Nazis or Cold War
Communists belong to the first two schools of thought. The last three schools formed as time
elapsed after World War Two and as information became declassified and therefore available to
historians.
The German school consists of individuals who believe that German failure at Kursk was
not inevitable. For example, Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, commander of the forces in the
south German sector during the engagement, stated that Hitler had stopped the attack too soon, a
decision that he described as "tantamount to throwing away a victory."1 On the contrary,
research shows that the German forces could not have achieved Operation CITADEL’s goal of a
massive encirclement, let alone reduced the Soviet forces that would have remained in this
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Erich von Manstein, Lost Victories: The War Memoirs of Hitler’s Most Brilliant General, p. 449.
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encirclement. The evidence does indicate, however, that Hitler placed too many restrictions on
his subordinates and withdrew the best armored formations too soon. Von Manstein’s statement
is a perfect example of the German school of thought's inherent problem—rationalization and
blame obfuscation.
The basis for the German view is a tendency of defeated people to rationalize when
looking back at the previous war, instead of examining objectively the reasons for their failure
whether personal or national. The German school of thought often tries to place the onus of
Germany's downfall during World War II on Adolf Hitler's shoulders because of his “meddling”
in the conduct of the war. Although there is some merit to certain points of this argument, its
exponents seem to be trying to exonerate themselves and to deflect the blame from the rest of the
German people, the German officer corps, the German armed forces, indeed, even Germany
itself. In other words, this viewpoint attempts to romanticize and rationalize away the German
reverse at Kursk and the destruction of the Third Reich in general.
Out of the German school of thought come many works on the crucial battle at Kursk and
the earlier Battle of Stalingrad. Representative defenders of the German viewpoint are Erich von
Manstein, Martin Caidin, Paul Carrell, and F. W. von Mellenthin, among others.2 Because of
their personal biases and outright attempts to pass on the blame for the failure of CITADEL and
the war, their arguments and their information require cautious reading. They do make two valid
points. First, Hitler waited far too long to execute Operation CITADEL, and, second, von
Manstein's desire to keep attacking when Hitler ordered the end of the attack was the correct one,
as German armored forces could have completed the destruction of the Soviet armored reserves.
What von Manstein and the other proponents of this school do not adequately explain is how this
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feat of arms would have been achieved, nor do they explore the strategic-operational
ramifications of continued attack while the Soviet counteroffensives that were occurring in the
Orel bulge and along the Mius River.
The Soviet view lies at the other end of the spectrum—the Germans were doomed to fail
at Kursk from the beginning. These historians, for their own or their regime's political purposes,
heavily edited the writings of Marshal Konstantin Rokossovsky, Marshal Sergei Shtemenko,
Major General Pavel Rotmistrov, Marshal Georgi Zhukov, and other wartime leaders. Zhukov,
in fact, found himself completely written out of official Soviet history, redeemed, and then again
ignored as his political fortunes waxed and waned during the decades following World War
Two.3 Thus, like the German school, Soviet interpretations rest on ulterior motives and reflect a
shameless skewing of facts by Soviet officialdom. Yet, many Soviet authors actually believed
that CITADEL's failure was not a foregone conclusion, that Soviet chances of victory improved
after each instance of German hesitation, and that the outcome of the battle was uncertain until
after the tank battle of Prokhorovka. Nevertheless, the Communist Party kept these views from
reaching the Soviet general population.
The view of Western historians such as Geoffrey Jukes, Alan Clark, John Erickson, and
Earl Ziemke who wrote prior to ULTRA declassification was somewhat distorted but not nearly
as egregiously as that of the Cold War Soviet historians.4 ULTRA was the Anglo-American
codename for intelligence material gleaned from deciphered secret German Enigma radio

2 Ibid; Martin Caidin, The Tigers Are Burning; Paul Carell, Hitler Moves East, 1941-1943; F. W.
Mellenthin, Panzer Battles: A Study of the Employment of Armor in the Second World War.
3Konstantin K. Rokossovsky, A Soldier's Duty; Pavel Rotmistrov, Main Front: Soviet Leaders Look Back
on World War II; "Tanks Against Tanks," Sergei M. Shtemenko, The Soviet General Staff at War 1941-45; Georgi
K. Zhukov, Marshal Zhukov's Greatest Battles; Otto Chaney, Zhukov, pp. 368-271, 387.
4 Geoffrey Jukes, Kursk: The Clash of Armour; Alan Clark, Barbarossa: The Russian-German Conflict,
1941-1945; John Erickson, The Road to Berlin: Continuing the History of Stalin’s War with Germany; Earl F.
Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in the East.
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transmissions. The German High Command used Enigma-based ciphers to send instructions via
radio to units outside Germany, which included U-boats, the Afrika Korps, and others. Without
the knowledge of ULTRA's existence and the Allied governments' prohibition on the discussion
of this material, the victory at Kursk appeared even more of a decisive Soviet military
accomplishment than it was, just as the Allied victories of the Battle of Britain, the Battle of the
Atlantic, Sicily, Normandy, and the pursuit across France seem less feats of arms than of
intelligence. In other words, the decisions that seemed to be so insightful and military strength
that seemed to be so pervasive are not nearly as impressive with the understanding that one side
knew the other’s plans. Because of this, the works written by Anglo-American historians before
1974, when Ultra was declassified, made the Soviet leaders appear more insightful in their
course of action and the combat capabilities of the Red Army seem greater during the summer of
1943 and made the Battle of Kursk's outcome appear to be a clear foregone conclusion.
Modern mainstream historians argue cogently that Operation CITADEL was a great
gamble, but if the Germans had executed it as originally planned, they might have pinched off
the salient and destroyed a significant grouping of Red Army forces. Robin Cross, David
Glantz, Jonathan House, and Mark Healy are some of the authors who fall into this category, and
they are the proponents of the most reliable and balanced view of this titanic battle.5 These same
historians agree that Hitler's decision to stop the battle was the correct one and that continuing
the attack would have been militarily unfeasible. This school of thought views von Manstein’s
criticism of Hitler’s decision as partly postwar recrimination and partly blame obfuscation.
The modern revisionist school holds that the Germans were closer to victory on the
southern axis than previously thought. The best example of an author who maintains this view is
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George Nipe. In a detailed analysis of the Battle of Kursk, he argues that von Manstein, given a
free hand by Hitler, could have achieved much more than he did.6 Nipe and like-minded authors
base their case in part on the Germans’ better tank killing ratio and the availability of
uncommitted German reserves that might have turned the tide. In their opinion, this would
validate von Manstein’s criticism of Hitler’s decision and, consequently, vindicate von
Manstein. This, however, fails to examine the Soviet side of the equation. Specifically, their
argument neglects issues such as the uncommitted Soviet reserves available, the effect of Red
Army actions outside of the Kursk salient, and the successful Central Front defense against the
German Ninth Army on the northern axis.
Overall, the evidence suggests that neither Hitler nor Field Marshal Erich von Manstein
were completely wrong. Hitler was right to stop further penetration into Soviet territory, but he
should have given von Manstein more freedom to execute operations as he saw fit and to finish
the battle in as favorable a fashion as possible. Von Manstein, on the other hand, was incorrect
in believing that he could salvage a German strategic victory out of the situation on July 13.
Indeed, there was no chance of such an outcome once Hitler delayed Operation CITADEL until
June 4, 1943

5

Robin Cross, Citadel: The Battle of Kursk; David M. Glantz and Jonathan M. House, The Battle of
Kursk; Mark Healy, Kursk 1943: The Tide Turns in the East.
6 George M Nipe, “Kursk Reconsidered: Germany’s Lost Victory?” World War II Articles 1998,
http://www.thehistorynet.com/WorldWarII.
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As a whole, there was potential to end the Battle of Kursk in a manner more favorable to
the German cause if Hitler had allowed von Manstein to conclude the battle at an operational
level a strategic victory.

CHAPTER 2
STRATEGIC SITUATION AND PLANS
In the spring of 1943, the Soviet and Nazi High Commands planned to renew operations
as soon as the muddy ground and weather allowed offensive movement. The Germans had just
proved how resilient they were after von Manstein’s counterattack successfully pushed the
Soviets out of Kharkov and east of the Donets River. At the same time, the Soviets were looking
to renew the expulsion of the fascist invaders to the west. Both assessed their situation and made
plans for the summer of 1943. The Soviets decided to adopt a strategic defensive that would be
followed by massive counterattack, where the Germans decided to adopt a strategic offensive
that would be followed by a strategic defensive.
The strategic situation appeared to be that the Axis had reached its high tide in 1942 and
was showing distinct signs of ebbing in 1943. Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and Imperial Japan,
however, were far from beaten. Many months had to pass, many battles had to be fought, and
many lives had yet to be lost in order to defeat the Axis's combined strength of arms and will.
The year of 1943 would begin with the Axis and the Allies vying for strategic initiative, but by
the beginning of 1944 the initiative was firmly in the hands of the Allies across the globe.
In the naval arena the Allies had essentially won the Battle of the Atlantic by the summer
of 1943. The Anglo-American anti-submarine warfare effort had grown continually in
personnel, equipment, and technology. The U-boat arm of the German Navy could not keep
pace with the combined American and British shipbuilding industries, the proliferation of sonar,
and the increasing air coverage provided by escort carriers and land-based aircraft. The result
was that in 1943 Germany lost 237 U-boats and had only 272 enter service. Therefore, the
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Battle of the Atlantic was clearly going in the Allies' favor by the time of CITADEL's execution,
but the U-boats continued to tie down Allied naval resources for some time.1
Anglo-American strength also was growing in the British Isles in preparation for a crosschannel invasion. The British, using primarily one Canadian Infantry Division, had executed a
raid at the French port of Dieppe in August of 1942 with disastrous results. Despite the heavy
cost, there were many valuable lessons that helped shape plans for future invasion of France.
Partly from this raid, Hitler knew that there was a growing possibility of a cross-channel
invasion, and he ordered the fortification and reinforcement of the French coastline against this
contingency. Thus, the mere threat of invasion drew precious German resources to both the
Atlantic Wall and to the Mediterranean Theater and away from the Eastern Front.
Allied bombing efforts increased the pressure on Germany as well. The U.S. Army Air
Corps staged its first daylight bombing operation in January 1943, and the RAF resumed night
bombing but with four-engine bombers instead of the smaller two-engine bombers.2 This Allied
bombing offensive drew vital German fighters and supplies, especially fuel, away from the war
with the Soviet Union. As the aerial bombardment continued, many German soldiers and
citizens came to realize that they were not winning the war and Hitler was indeed fallible.
The fortunes of the Axis continued their downward spiral in Africa early in 1943.
General Erwin Rommel's Africa Corps had already retreated west from Egypt under heavy
pressure from General Montgomery's Eighth Army. After November 1942, the Africa Corps
also had to fight the American forces that had landed in French North Africa. Because of the
American landing, Hitler had dispatched five divisions to North Africa. This reinforcement

1

H. P. Willmott, The Great Crusade: A New Complete History of The Second World War, p. 268.
Gerhard L. Weinberg, The World At Arms: A Global History of World War II, p. 360; Earl F. Ziemke,
Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in the East, p. 119.
2
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stabilized the situation until both the American and British forces were able to attack
simultaneously, slowly strangling German and Italian forces in Tunisia with a ground, air, and
naval cordon.
Axis troops in Tunisia surrendered in May 1943, and this constituted a heavy loss of
well-trained men and of materiel, especially new tanks. A total of 93,000 Germans and 182,000
Italians laid down their arms at “Tunisgrad,” which was how many of the German soldiers
referred to the defeat at Tunis. In numbers of men and volume of equipment, the downfall at
Tunis was roughly of the same order as the Axis defeat at Stalingrad.3 The magnitude of that
defeat was a result of Hitler's folly in insisting on sending troops to Africa while the Axis was
steadily losing control of the Mediterranean Sea. The end result was that the "soft underbelly"
continued to yield to Allied advances and would lead to the Anglo-American invasion of Sicily,
codenamed Operation Husky, in July.
On the Russo-German front the line of contact was nearly identical to what it had been in
the summer of 1942—a line running through Leningrad, Velikiye Luki, Orel, Belgorod,
Voroshilovgrad, and Rostov with the addition of the Taman bridgehead. The major differences
were large salients in the central and southern regions. The two most important of these bulges
centered on Orel and Kursk. Because the shape of the front lines in these two areas, they were
natural points of attack.4 The Kursk salient presented offensive opportunities to the Germans, as
it was a large area vulnerable to a double envelopment striking its respective shoulders. From
the Soviet point of view, the Orel salient that the German Ninth Army held was vulnerable to a
3

Willmott, Great Crusade, pp. 199 and 240; Weinberg, The World At Arms, p. 431.
4 Robin Cross, Citadel: The Battle of Kursk, p. 22. A salient provides an attacking force the advantage of
easier encirclement than does a linear front. This is because the attacker can strike both "shoulders" of the salient,
penetrate on both sides, and link up his forces at the base of the bulge in the front lines. However, an "S" in the
front provides the enemy the same benefit if he is attacking, as there is a vulnerability from either point of view.
The force that manages to seize the initiative holds the advantage.
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similar attack. Hence, the shape of the front presented both the Wehrmacht and the Red Army
with an opportunity for a double envelopment and the destruction of enemy forces that this form
of attack inherently offers.
The combat strength of the opposing armies was also very different from the previous
two years of conflict. The Wehrmacht no longer had the superiority of material and skill to
mount grand, front-wide offensives as they had in the previous two summers. Too many
casualties among the experienced soldiers and an influx of lower quality replacements had
diluted the overall effectiveness of the German Army. The German High Command had taken
steps to improve the situation by producing better tanks, such as the heavy Tiger tank and the
medium Panther tank, but this was still only a technological stopgap solution to a larger
manpower problem. The Soviet Union's military had grown into a powerful and skilled enemy
after the first two years of fighting. The period of mass surrenders and ineffectual,
uncoordinated attacks was over by 1943. The Red Army now consisted of armored forces
capable of deep offensive operations, durable infantry, and abundant artillery that could launch
vast numbers of rockets and shells against the German forces. Marshal Tukhachevsky's deep
operational theories were bearing theoretical, organizational, and technological fruit.5
Both Stalin and Hitler strove to find a way to defeat their enemy and turn the war in their
favor. Hitler wanted to win a major battle that would "be a beacon to the world."6 To this end,
he needed this battle to achieve three objectives: keep the Soviets from taking the initiative,
5

Cross, Citadel, pp. 65-68; David Glantz and Jonathan House, The Battle of Kursk, pp. 273 and 280-281.
Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky was the progenitor of the Soviets' deep operations theory and the idea of the
operational level of war, which was distinct from tactics. Tukhachevsky’s deep operations theory also revolved
around three operational stages in time and space as well as synergy of force. The first stage was penetration by an
infantry-oriented combined force of the tactical outer layer of the enemy’s defense, the second stage consisted of the
breakthrough of the defender’s operational depth by an armored force, and the third stage concerned the rout of the
defender beyond his operational depth. Tukhachevsky worked on his theories during the late 1920s and 1930s.
Stalin ordered his execution due to his influence on the Red Army. Shimon Naveh in Stalin’s Generals, pp.272-73.
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damage the Red Army to an extent that would make up for the Stalingrad debacle, and shorten
the German defensive line. He and his staff put much effort into setting the conditions to bring
about a victory with the magnitude to meet Hitler's three objectives. Stalin, on the other hand,
wanted a victory that would turn the tide his favor once and for all. He had thought his military
forces had reached that point during both the Battle of Moscow and the Battle of Stalingrad, but
the Wehrmacht had bounced back on both occasions. Additionally, von Manstein’s surprise
counterattack that sent a pursuing Red Army reeling after Stalingrad was a demonstration of the
German Army's recuperative powers. Stalin deemed von Manstein's counteroffensive so
successful that he thought the war would continue for the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, he
pushed his officers to come up with a plan to defeat the German forces arrayed against him.
Hitler's overall vision for German operations for 1943 consisted of two general phases.
The first step was to consolidate the front by executing several small-scale offensive operations
to straighten the front lines. Following this spring consolidation in the central and southern
sectors, the second phase would begin with an offensive by German and Finnish forces that
would finally take Leningrad. Timing was crucial element for the success of Hitler's plans. Any
major deviation from the summer time table would result in the delay or cancellation of the
attack upon Leningrad in late 1943.
To meet the objectives of the first phase of Hitler's plan the OKW and the OKH came up
with three possible courses of action for consolidation in the south. Codenamed HAWK,
PANTHER, and CITADEL, they all involved the execution of the Kesselschlacht or the classic
double envelopment maneuver. Each was an offensive with the objectives of destroying Soviet
forces, protecting the Donets Basin resources, and shortening the front lines. Historians and

6Adolf

Hitler, "Operations Order No. 6 (Citadel) of 15.4.1943," in Glantz and House Kursk, pp. 356-60.
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participants alike think that the 1943 plans would have had a chance of success. The three
operations were "conceived as part of a coherent and not unpromising strategy that envisioned a
series of limited offensives to consolidate German defenses."7 However, timing and rapid
success were very important to the overall plans fruition. Von Manstein stated that a German
offensive "must be made to strike the enemy . . . before he could recover from his losses in the
winter campaign."8 Operation CITADEL was the most ambitious of the three proposed
operations, as it was supposed to reoccupy the entire Kursk salient and destroy Soviet forces on
the scale of the 1941 Kiev operation. Colonel-General Kurt Zeitzler the Chief of Staff of the
German Army High Command, or the OKH, created CITADEL's the plan of operations.
Operation CITADEL appealed to two of Hitler's major interests: a grandiose offensive
goal and new wonder weapons. CITADEL's objectives were grandiose because of the relative
balance in combat power between the Red Army and the Wehrmacht and the many delays in
launching the operation gave the Red Army plenty of time to prepare. Due to delays, the
German Army would be facing a battle-hardened and dug-in Red Army and not the unprepared
and poorly led Soviet troops that they faced during the invasion in 1941. Hitler's expectations of
his forces to defeat the Soviets on the scale of 1941 were consequently preposterous. Similarly,
the notion that the Germans could form large reserves after penetrating, isolating, and reducing
the massive Soviet prepared defense was equally improbable. Hitler also hoped to compensate
for the German relative numerical parity with technologically advanced weapons he loved so
much, most notably the Panther tank and Elephant tank destroyer. Hitler's reliance on and trust

7

Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin, pp. 124-127. HAWK was originally HABICHT in German and CITADEL
was similarly ZITADELLE in German.
8 Erich von Manstein, Lost Victories: The War Memoirs of Hitler’s Most Brilliant General, p. 446; Martin
Caidin, The Tigers Are Burning, p. 22.
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in the power of new technology would prove to be misplaced throughout the war, as he would
continue to count on wonder weapons to turn the tide against the Allies until the very end.
There were also two main political issues that influenced Hitler's decision to execute
Operation CITADEL. First, Hitler "assumed that successes in the East would rattle the very
foundations of the Allied coalition, causing it to disintegrate under pressure from Soviet
dissatisfaction at American and British delays in opening a second front."9 However, it is very
improbable the alliance would have disintegrated had CITADEL succeeded. Second, the
operation was the brainchild of General Zeitzler, and Zeitzler was one of Hitler's "favorites." In
fact, Hitler had already promoted him to Chief of Staff over scores of more senior officers.
Because "his" general came up CITADEL, Hitler hoped to win a great victory using "his" plan.
Thus, he wanted victory with a plan designed by one of his "own" generals and not conceived by
the old corps of German generals.
There were several military issues that also influenced Hitler's decision to execute
CITADEL. First, he knew that the summer of 1943 might be that last time the Axis could attack
in the east without the threat of an invasion of Western Europe. This threat lent impetus to
Hitler’s predilection for offensives that gave him the strategic outcome he desired, and this was
offensive in this mold. Hitler also leaned toward Operation CITADEL as he did not have to wait
for Stalin to oblige him by launching an offensive, as Germany's dictator naturally desired to
seize the initiative whenever possible whether prudent or not.10 Hitler and his staff envisioned

9

Rudolf Lehmann, The Leibstandarte III: 1 SS Panzer Division Liebstandarte Adolf Hitler, III, 201;
Christopher Ailsby, SS: Hell on the Eastern Front: The Waffen SS War in Russia, 1941-1945, p. 69. Hitler believed
that a success against the Red Army would exacerbate Stalin’s dissatisfaction with the Anglo-American delays in
opening a second front on the European Continent proper. Thus, Hitler hoped that a major Soviet defeat coupled
with a lack of an Allied attack on the European continent would end the cooperation between the Soviet Union and
the of the Anglo-American Allies.
10 Theodor Busse, Zitadelle Offensive, pp. 8-10. Hitler knew that the Anglo-American invasion was only
a matter of time due to their victories in Africa and the well-known American desire for a cross-channel invasion.
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that CITADEL executed in the spring would allow the final attack on Leningrad; thus, his desire
to seize Leningrad also played a part in his decision for CITADEL. The German High
Command similarly hoped that CITADEL and the seizure of Leningrad would stabilize the entire
Eastern Front and allow Germany to create sufficient reserve forces to parry any Soviet
offensives or any invasion elsewhere.11 The overarching military purpose of CITADEL was to
"render the enemy incapable of a decisive offensive for the entire summer."12
Hitler based his decision on inept tactical, operational, and strategic intelligence
gathering operations as well. The German intelligence corps often incorrectly analyzed the data
they had gathered, and, to make matters worse, Hitler usually ignored any intelligence data that
contradicted his intuition. He also severely rebuked nearly all that promulgated any views
contrary to what he believed, which resulted in a very skewed analysis. Furthermore, the Soviets
were very adept at both intelligence and counterintelligence operations; consequently, the
German intelligence gathering efforts were often based on Soviet deception measures or were
incomplete.
Once Hitler had confirmed the execution of CITADEL, the OKH planned to attack in the
spring after the ground had dried sufficiently to allow good off-road mobility and permit rapid
motorized transportation. The date was set for March 13, 1943 with Field Marshal Erich von
Manstein's forces attacking the southern face of the Kursk salient and General Walter Model's

Also, a defensive-offensive operation is one that starts on the defense and then transitions to the offense when the
enemy no longer has the strength to attack and is ripe for a successful counterattack.
11 Weinberg, A World At Arms, p. 601.
12 Rudolf Lehmann, The Leibstandarte III: 1 SS Panzer Division Liebstandarte Adolf Hitler, III, 201;
Christopher Ailsby, SS: Hell on the Eastern Front: The Waffen SS War in Russia, 1941-1945, p. 69.
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Ninth Army attacking the northern face. To allow Model sufficient forces to attack, the OKH
ordered his Ninth Army to evacuate the Rzhev salient.13
From the Soviet point of view, Stalin's intent was to begin the final and irresistible
expulsion of the Fascists from Russian soil and subsequently end their occupation of all Soviet
territory. The operations during the summer of 1943 were to usher in this phase. Stalin wished
to attack in the Ukraine as he had the previous summer but on a larger scale. Marshall Zhukov
did not agree. He wished to fight on the defensive initially and then counterattack just as the
Red Army had successfully done at Moscow and at Stalingrad.
Intelligence had a significant impact on the strategic difference of opinion between Stalin
and Zhukov. The British gave the Soviets ULTRA information shortly after the Germans had
sketched the execution of CITADEL, which included nearly the entire plan of operations. Stalin
was willing to trust British intelligence in 1943, unlike in 1941 when the British warned him of
the imminent German attack because he suspected the British of trying to draw the Soviet Union
into the war with Germany. The Soviets also had their own successful intelligence-gathering
machinery, the most important of which was the LUCY spy ring. As a whole, these sources
corroborated the British ULTRA intelligence, and Stalin chose to heed what the British and
Soviet sources were telling him, which was so unlike his treatment of the intelligence indicators
before Operation BARBAROSSA and Operation BLUE.14

13 Zeimke, Stalingrad to Berlin, pp. 115-117. Once Hitler gave Army Group North permission to evacuate
the Demyansk pocket, Ninth Army holding the Rzhev held no purpose. Hitler agreed with Field Marshal Gunther
von Kluge's proposal to straighten the front through a withdrawal. The Wehrmacht completed this withdrawal by 23
March 1943, and it shortened the front from 340 miles to 110 miles. This shortening of the lines increased the
density of the defense and freed up forces to act as reserves.
14 Geoffrey Jukes, Kursk: The Clash of Armour, pp. 45-47. The LUCY spy ring was a massive network of
spies that included many Germans who held important positions within the Nazi regime but did not agree with the
Nazi Party’s policies. Operation BARBAROSSA was the German invasion of the Soviet Union and operation
BLUE was the German summer offensive of 1942. The British had attempted to warn Stalin, but he refused to
believe the intelligence data.
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Stalin had slowly learned to trust his subordinate commanders and staff over the course
of the Russo-German War. This was especially true of Zhukov, who continued to demonstrate
his value and acumen as the war progressed. Even more importantly, Stalin had learned to curb
his predilection for a general offensive and for blindly holding onto terrain. He now was willing
to wait for the Germans to reach their culminating point and then launch a devastating
counterattack, which was the modus operandi adopted in the successful defense of Moscow and
Stalingrad.15 Stalin also understood the value of allowing his troops to avoid encirclement in
order to live to fight another day. Because Stalin believed the intelligence data that the Germans
would attack, he backed Zhukov's plan of a strategic defensive followed by counterattacks.
Thus, Zhukov managed to convince him to stay on the defensive within the Kursk salient, station
massive reserve formations within operational distance to affect the battlefield, and then execute
devastating counterattacks on the flanks of the German spent attacks. With this concept in mind,
members of the Soviet High Command, or the Stavka, planned the details to initially to defend
in-depth and then mount a massive counterattack.

15

Georgi Zhukov, Marshal Zhukov's Greatest Battles, p. 210.

CHAPTER 3
PREPARATION
After deciding on their course of action, the Red Army and the Wehrmacht began to
prepare to execute their respective summer operations. However, both the Axis and the Soviet
forces had suffered immensely in the previous two years, but both were able to muster their best
units, men, and equipment for the campaign in the Kursk region. The German forces involved
were, in some ways, the finest the Third Reich would field during the war. Indeed, "[the] state of
training, equipment, and morale of the units earmarked to participate in the attack was brought to
the highest peak ever reached heretofore and thereafter during the entire Russian Campaign."1
On the Soviet Union side, the leaders who were in charge of the defense and counterattack
during the Battle of Kursk were battle tested and would continue to build the Red Army into one
of the most powerful in history.
The German forces that participated in the attack consisted of most of the strategic
reserve—seventeen panzer and twenty-three infantry divisions. Furthermore, two reinforced air
armies, representing approximately two-thirds of the Luftwaffe's aircraft in the east, were to
support the ground units. The overall German force consisted of approximately 10,000 guns,
2,700 tanks, 2,000 aircraft, and 900,000 men. The Ninth Army commanded by Field Marshal
Walther Model, which was part of Field Marshal Gunther von Kluge's Army Group Center, was
to attack the north face of the Kursk salient on the axis of Orel-Kursk. Colonel General Ritter
von Greim's Sixth Luftflotte, or air group, was to support this attack. Meanwhile, Colonel
General Hermann Hoth's Fourth Panzer Army and Army Group Kempf, which were part of von
Manstein's Army Group South, were to attack the southern face of the salient. General Otto
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Dessloch's Luftflotte Four was to support the southern assault group from the air.2 Thus, the
large number of units involved indicates that the Nazi leaders considered the outcome of the
battle essential for the future of the Third Reich.
The Soviets also realized the importance of the coming battle and planned accordingly.
Zhukov's overall concept for Kursk called for a defense in depth followed by a massive
counterattack when the Wehrmacht was vulnerable. To this end, vast numbers of men and
equipment moved into the area. The Red Army forces in the Kursk and Orel region reached
approximately 1.3 million men, 75 infantry divisions, and 3,500 tanks and self-propelled guns.
The Stavka further augmented these formations with 20,000 artillery pieces and 2,400 aircraft,
which meant that the initial number of Soviet personnel in theater was 66 percent higher than
that of the Germans. Zhukov broke these forces into three Fronts, whose area of operations lay
astride the expected major axes of attack.3 He positioned the Central Front under the command
of General Konstantin Rokossovsky in the north and the Voronezh Front under the command of
General Nikolai Vatutin in the south. Zhukov placed the Steppe Front commanded by Colonel
General Ivan Konev to the east of the Kursk salient. The Steppe Front was to act as a strategic
and operational reserve. More specifically, Konev’s mission was either to reinforce during the
defensive phase of the battle or to attack in a counteroffensive role depending on the course of
the upcoming battle.4
The Wehrmacht ensured that there was thorough training of officers and noncommissioned officers prior to the battle.5 Hitler knew he needed a victory; consequently, he
brought his most able and most reliable officers to crush the Kursk salient. As always, he
2
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remained the Feldherr or supreme German warlord. He would direct the battle as he saw fit, but
he did allow his generals more operational freedom than he had during the winter crisis of 194142 and during Stalingrad. One of the most notable outward signs of Hitler’s desire to control the
battle was the appointment of General Kurt Zeitzler as the new Chief of the German General
Staff. Zeitzler was in that position more from currying the favor of Hitler than for seniority or
military accomplishment. Hitler was also growing more suspicious of the German officer corps
and consequently favored politically reliable officers over those who were merely realists. Due
to his lack of seniority and accomplishment, Zeitzler did not have the influence over the officer
corps that another more experienced, more respected officer might have had. Zeitzler’s weak
hold on the officer corps probably caused him to back CITADEL, his own brainchild, far longer
than was reasonable because that was a way to impress upon his fellow officers his will and
determination. Moreover, the officers who would actually execute CITADEL were the crème of
the German officer corps, and Zeitzler probably felt he could not back down without
undermining his authority in their eyes.
The first of the CITADEL leaders with whom Zeitzler had to deal was Field Marshal
Gunther von Kluge. Von Kluge commanded Army Group Center and would orchestrate the
overall operations against the north face of the Kursk salient. He was "a traditional Prussian
officer who showed considerable aptitude for his chosen profession" and had a long record of
success that included leading the German Fourth Army during Operation Barbarossa and

4

Cross, Citadel, p. 140; U.S. Army Concepts Analysis Agency, Kursk Operation Simulation and
Validation Exercise – Phase III (KOSAVE II), vi; Jukes, Kursk, pp.48-49.
5 Lehmann, Leibstandarte, III, 197.

21

assuming command of Army Group Center during the winter battles of 1941-42. Von Kluge’s
primary subordinate for the Battle of Kursk was the able Colonel General Walther Model.6
Model commanded Ninth Army. His mission was to breakthrough between the OrelKursk highway and then penetrate to Kursk.7 In addition, the plan called for Ninth Army to
drive its spearheads far enough east so that the new German front guaranteed the use of the
railroad network through Maloarkhangelsk to Kursk. General Model had commanded Ninth
Army for some time, and his subordinates were gifted generals who had been in their current
positions within Ninth Army for some time. These subordinates included General Hans Zorn,
General Joachim Lemelsen, General Joseph Harpe, General Johannes Freissner, and General
Freiherr von Roman.
General Model's subordinate commanders controlled immense forces. Zorn commanded
the XXXXVI Panzer Corps, which consisted of the 258th Infantry Division, the 7th Infantry
Division, the 102nd Infantry Division, and the 31st Infantry Division. His mission was to protect
the flank of XXXXVII Panzer Corps during the penetration and subsequent exploitation.
Lemelsen commanded the XXXXVII Panzer Corps. XXXXVII Panzer Corps included the 20th
Panzer Division, the 2nd Panzer Division, the 6th Infantry Division, and the 9th Panzer Division.
The Corps' mission was to deliver the main blow in the center of the Ninth Army zone, affect a
rapid advance to the high ground north of Kursk, and link up with the forward elements of the
Fourth Panzer Army. The XXXXI Panzer Corps, commanded by Harpe, was comprised of the
292nd Infantry Division, the 86th Infantry Division, and the 18th Panzer Division. His forces
were to protect the flank of the Ninth Army main effort and tie in with XXIII Corps as it
attempted to seize Maloarkhangelsk. Freissner commanded the XXIII Army Corps, which was
6
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composed of the 78th Sturm Division, the 383rd Infantry Division, and the 216th Infantry
Division. This corps' mission was to seize the town of Maloarkhangelsk and establish a new line
east of the railroad. The XX Army Corps, commanded by von Roman, included the 45th
Infantry Division, the 72nd Infantry Division, the 137th Infantry Division, and the 251st Infantry
Division. Once the enemy began withdrawing, von Roman’s Corps was "to form three groups
and attack south." Model also kept the 36th Infantry Division and the 12th Panzer Division in
reserves behind the XXXXVII Panzer Corps zone. Colonel General von Greim's Luftflotte Six
would again support Model's Ninth Army.8
Field Marshal von Manstein’s larger and more powerful Army Group South was to
“drive a sharp wedge toward Kursk via Oboyan, aggressively [screen] its eastern flank, and seek
contact with the Ninth Army on the heights north of Kursk.”9 Von Manstein ordered that, after
Army Group South had established a new defensive line, all available forces to concentrate in an
effort to destroy the enemy units sealed off in the salient. Army Group South's offensive forces
consisted of the Fourth Panzer Army, commanded by Colonel General Hoth and Army
Detachment Kempf commanded by General of the Panzertruppen Werner Kempf. Von Manstein
also held General Walter Nehling's XXIV Panzer Corps in operational reserve and had General
of the Luftwaffe Dessloch's Luftflotte Four providing air cover and close air support.10
The Fourth Panzer Army "was to conduct the main effort attack against Kursk with the
objective of quickly establishing contact with Ninth Army." Fourth Panzer Army leaders were
well-seasoned veterans. General of the Panzertruppen Otto von Knobelsdorff commanded the
experienced XXXXVIII Panzer Corps. On his right was SS Obergruppenfuhrer Paul Hausser
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commanding the powerful II SS Panzer Corps. General of the Infantry Eugen Ott held the left
flank of the Army with the LII Army Corps. The XXXXVIII Panzer Corps consisted of 3rd
Panzer Division, Grossdeutschland Panzer Grenadier Division, 11th Panzer Division, 10th
(Panther) Tank Brigade, and 167th Infantry Division. The XXXXVIII Panzer Corps’ mission
was the primary thrust toward Oboyan and the link-up with Ninth Army. The 1st SS, 2nd SS,
and 3rd SS Panzer Grenadier Divisions comprised the II SS Panzer Corps. The SS Corps also
had lavish modern combat support and combat service support units, and its mission was to
engage enemy reserves "approaching from an easterly direction" and to destroy these forces
before the linkup of the Fourth Panzer Army and the Ninth Army. The 225th, 332nd, and 57th
Infantry Divisions made up the LII Army Corps. The LII's mission was to make a diversionary
attack on the first day and subsequently protect the western flank of the XXXXVIII Panzer
Corps.11
Von Manstein assigned Army Detachment Kempf to aggressively screen the right flank
of the main effort attack of the Fourth Panzer Army. Colonel General Werner Kempf’s
subordinate commanders included General of the Panzertruppen Erhard Rauss, General of the
Infantry Franz Mattenklott, and General of the Panzertruppen Hermann Breith. General Rauss
commanded the XI Army Corps whose mission was to support the III Panzer Corps' right flank
and support its attacks. XI Corps consisted of 106th and 320th Infantry Divisions. With
primarily a defensive role, General Mattenklott commanded the XLII Army Corps and his
subordinate units were 39th, 161st, and 282nd Infantry Divisions. Due to his mission,
Mattenklott's forces were not extensively involved in attack on Kursk. General Breith
commanded the III Panzer Corps whose mission was to "engage and defeat the strong enemy
10
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reserve" and a possible "thrust northeast or north in conjunction with the forces on the right wing
of the Fourth Panzer Army."12 The III Panzer Corps commanded 168th Infantry, 19 Panzer, 6th
Panzer, and 7th Panzer Divisions.
Stalin, like Hitler, was both the supreme commander of his nation’s highest headquarters
and the ruthless dictator of his nation. Both kept a firm grasp on all aspects of the war, but Stalin
was much more inclined to trust his generals than Hitler. Stalin placed one of his most capable
generals and his military deputy, Marshal Georgi K. Zhukov, in overall command of all the
Soviet forces involved in the Battle of Kursk. Moreover, it had been Zhukov's vision that the
Stavka adopted for the defense and the subsequent counterattack plan, so Stalin's choice for
Zhukov as the commander was very logical. Zhukov would bring in a group of very able and
experienced officers to command the Soviet forces involved in the Battle of Kursk.13
Colonel General Konstantin Rokossovsky commanded the Central Front, which Zhukov
positioned on the northern shoulder of the Kursk salient. Rokossovsky was of Polish descent
and birth, but he was an ardent Communist despite the fact that the Soviet government had
imprisoned him for three years during Stalin’s officer purges of the 1930’s. He had proven his
ability and gained experience throughout the Russo-German War. Rokossovsky had led the 9th
Mechanized Corps during the German invasion in the summer and fall of 1941, the 16th Army
during the critical Battle of Moscow, the Don Front with distinction during the Battle of
Stalingrad, and the Central Front in the audacious but unsuccessful offensives in February 1943.
He also had prewar ties to Zhukov, as the two served together in the 15th Cavalry Division.
Rokossovsky's star would continue to rise throughout and after the war. His Central Front
11
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consisted of 60th Army, 65th Army, 70th Army, 13th Army, 48th Army, 2nd Tank Army, 9th
Tank Corps, and 19th Tank Corps. Additionally, 16th Air Army, which Air Marshal Krasovsky
commanded, supported General Rokossovsky's forces.14 The Stavka also heavily reinforced the
Central Front with anti-tank weapons and artillery. In fact, Central Front's defense was superior
to Voronezh Front's as it had greater unit density and was on more defensible terrain.
Colonel General Nikolai Vatutin commanded the Voronezh Front on the southern
shoulder of the Kursk salient. He had served in many very important staff positions during the
Great Patriotic War. Vatutin had been the Northwestern Front chief of staff during the German
invasion of 1941, the deputy chief of the general staff, and then a Stavka representative on the
Bryansk Front. He also led Voronezh Front beginning in July 1942, the Southwestern Front
during the Battle of Stalingrad, and the Voronezh Front again starting in March 1943. Most
importantly, Vatutin had proven himself both as Stalin's personal representative and as a military
leader on many occasions including the Battle of Stalingrad. His Voronezh Front consisted of
38th Army, 40th Army, 6th Guards Army, 69th Army, 7th Guards Army, 1st Tank Army, 35th
Guards Rifle Corps, 2d Guards Tank Corps, and 5th Guards Tank Corps. Additionally, 2nd Air
Army, which Air Marshal Rudenko led, provided air support General Vatutin's units. The
Voronezh Front, like the Central Front, had abundant anti-tank weaponry and artillery; however,
the Voronezh Front was facing the stronger of the two German attack groupings, and it was on
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less defensible terrain than the Central Front. Furthermore, erroneous intelligence misled
Vatutin into concentrating his defense away from the actual point of the German attack.15
Colonel General Ivan Konev commanded the Steppe Military District, which would be
renamed the Steppe Front in May 1943. This massive formation was in reserve to the east of the
Kursk salient and "represented nothing less than Stavka's entire strategic reserve."16 Konev was
a World War and Civil War veteran who had fought for the Red Army after 1918. In 1941 he
had led ad hoc formations during the Battle of Smolensk and in the Western Front prior to the
Battle of Moscow. Konev subsequently commanded the Kalinin Front during the Battle of
Moscow and then the Western Front during the disastrous Operation MARS. He hoped that his
Steppe Front would be committed in toto, but this would not be the case. Konev's huge
organization consisted of 4th Guards Army, 5th Guards Army, 5th Guards Tank Army, 47th
Army, 27th Army, 53rd Army, 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps, 5th Guards Cavalry Corps, 7th
Guards Cavalry Corps, 4th Guards Tank Corps, 3rd Guards Mechanized Corps, 3rd Guards Tank
Corps, 10th Tank Corps, and 1st Mechanized Corps. Additionally, 5th Air Army, which
Colonel-General Goryunov commanded, supported Konev. Zhukov positioned this massive
formation of ground and air units to counter a German offensive across a broad front and to
cover the three main attack axes. The Steppe Front’s mission was primarily an offensive one,
whether as a counterattacking force within the defensive framework or as a purely offensive
operation. It is also crucial to note that at this time the Stavka moved 27th and 53rd Army east
of Kursk and 46th and 47th Armies east of Kharkov without detection by German intelligence.17
15 Healy, Kursk, p. 12; Ailsby, SS Hell, p. 70; S. P. Ivanov, "Completing the Turning Point in the War,"
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1983), p. 15.
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Operation CITADEL clearly had promise as a concept, but the Germans had made a
series of mistakes. For one thing, von Manstein had envisioned an attack in the first half of May
1943, but Hitler's series of delays pushed the actual attack back to July. Consequently, the attack
was probably doomed to failure from the onset due to the massive Soviet fortification and
reinforcement of the salient during the interim. By waiting Hitler had only made the prospects of
victory wane. The Red Army made superb use of time and their intelligence sources to prepare
the defense and the counterattack phases of their sound plan to defeat Operation CITADEL. A
second German error was that it was not necessary for General Kempf's forces to press eastward
from Belgorod to enlarge the operational attack. Kempf's mission was, first and foremost, to
protect the left flank of the Fourth Panzer Army first and would have better served the Fourth
Panzer Army by trailing the II SS Panzer Corps. By trailing the Fourth Panzer Army, Army
Detachment Kempf would have been on the defensive against counterattacks from the 7th
Guards Army and, later, from Steppe Front reinforcements. Kempf's men could also have used
the northern Donets River as their eastern flank, thus making Soviet counterattacks more
difficult. In this manner, von Manstein would have had more forces to keep in reserve and to
rotate in and out of the front line. He also could have used central position with respect to the
southern face of the Kursk salient. As it was, the Wehrmacht had an average of 92-97 percent of
its combat power engaged throughout the battle, while the Red Army had only roughly 66
percent of its forces engaged. The nearly constant combat conditions undoubtedly eroded the
German soldiers' effectiveness.18

close to victory at Kursk have not taken into account these Soviet Armies. Also of note is that Zhukov had to rescue
Konev on several occasions in the past, and Konev's luck would not turn for the better until the Battle of Kursk.
Some also argue that Stalin began grooming Konev as a political counterweight to Zhukov at this time. The Stavka
designed Operation MARS to cutoff the Rzhev salient and destroy the German forces therein. It was the twin to
Operation Uranus, which was the codename for the Soviet counterattack on Stalingrad.
18 Von Manstein, Lost Victories, p. 447; and KOSAVE II, vi.
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The Red Army and the Wehrmacht in 1943 were going in opposite directions. The Red
Army was on the rise with respect to overall fighting skill and battlefield success. It had suffered
many defeats at the hands of the Germans, but its leaders and soldiers had learned their painful
lessons and were ready to return the favor. The German armed forces had already reached their
zenith, and their fighting skills, on the whole, were beginning to wane.19 This is not to say that
the German forces at Kursk were not able fighters—they were the elite of the Wehrmacht—but
the remainder of the Axis military units on the eastern front were little better than those of the
1917 German Imperial Army. A perfect indicator is the steadily decreasing scope of the German
summer offensives. In 1941 the German Army attacked in three divergent directions across the
entire breadth of the Soviet Union. The Wehrmacht was able to attack only on the southern
portion of the front in 1942, although it was still strong enough to threaten both Stalingrad and
the Caucasus. Similarly, the German Army found itself reduced to attempting to destroy one
major salient in 1943. Another factor, perhaps even more telling than the decreasing scale of the
German strategic attacks, was transportation. In this regard the Wehrmacht was at a distinct
disadvantage to Soviet forces, which had been able to draw on American industry through the
Lend-Lease Program. Thus, "[t]he German equivalent to the Red Army quarter-ton jeep for
commander or messenger remained the horse. The counterpart of the Studebaker or Dodge sixwheeled drive truck was the horse-drawn panje wagon."20
One area that Hitler hoped would make up for the disparity of manpower and equipment
quantity between Germany and her foes was the procurement of "miracle weapons." To this end,
the Wehrmacht fielded many new pieces of equipment just prior to Kursk. The army deployed
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the Panther tank, the Elephant heavy tank destroyer, and the Brummbar self-propelled howitzer.
Hitler paid special attention to these new vehicles. In fact, his "interest in everything technical
led him to overestimate the importance of his technical resources. As a result, he would count
on a mere handful of assault gun detachments or the new Tiger tanks to restore situations where
large bodies of troops could not have any prospect of success."21
Of the "miracle weapons," only the previously tested Tiger, Hummel, and Wespe made
any real contribution to the battle. The new Panther tanks had problems ranging from
transmission failures to engine fires to getting stuck in minefields, and Hitler had delayed the
operation primarily for the new Panther tank. The new Elephant assault gun also had several
severe battlefield difficulties. It had a poor mobility as its engine lacked the horsepower to
compensate for the vehicle’s immense weight of 68 tons. Its tracks were also very vulnerable to
immobilization. Unlike the Panther, the Elephant had a fatal flaw in that it lacked a secondary
machinegun for self-protection. This failing made it easy prey for infantry tank killers.22 The
Wehrmacht also fielded the Brummbar but not in great numbers and it was an urban combat
vehicle; therefore, it had minimal effect on the Battle of Kursk.
Hitler delayed Operation CITADEL several times from the original date of execution of
May 25 or just after the spring thaw to wait for these new vehicles. He made the first
postponement to mid-June to wait for the Panthers. Although the high command agreed that the
21 Von Manstein, Lost Victories, p. 275. Although the author is attempting to exonerate himself on the
surface, his comments on Hitler remain accurate in this case. It is well documented that Hitler hoped that new
technologies would prove to be the difference on the battlefield, and this example is merely one of many instances.
22 James Lucas, Das Reich: The Military Role of the 2nd SS Division, p. 103; Jukes, Kursk, p. 38;
Helmuth Spaeter, The History of the Panzerkorps Grossdeutschland, II, 108; Timothy J. Kutta, "Elephants at War The Truth," Command: Military History, Strategy & Analysis, Issue 36/ March 1996, pp. 28-29; Carrell, Scorched
Earth, p. 40; Alan Clark, Barbarossa: The Russian-German Conflict, 1941-1945, p. 296. In fact, at that time only 50
Panthers and 25 Tigers were being produced each month. Hitler insisted on having these weapons in large
quantities for Operation CITADEL. Guderian, Inspector of the German Armored Force during the preparation for
Kursk, and Albert Speer, head of the German economic war effort at that time, endeavored to increase these
numbers.
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new date was the latest if the operation was to succeed, Hitler changed the date of the start of
CITADEL to July 4. Meanwhile, Ninth Army was falling behind in preparations due mostly to
heavy partisan activity in its rear, but Model had become deeply concerned by reports that the
Soviet Central Front was rapidly and thoroughly fortifying its entire defensive zone. It is a great
irony that the long delay for the new special weapons allowed the Soviets to prepare so
extensively and consequently, win the battle in which the new weapons played no decisive
role.23
The Luftwaffe deployed a full two-thirds of its aircraft on the Eastern Front to support
CITADEL. This included fighter aircraft that had the task of gaining air superiority over the
battlefield, which would allow the use of aircraft to support the ground offensive. The Junkers
Ju 87G-1, which was armed with two 37mm cannon, made its first appearance at Kursk with
devastating effect on Soviet armor. The Henschel Hs 129B, armed with an underfuselagemounted 30mm cannon, played a pivotal role as the first aircraft to destroy a battalion-sized
armor unit. This took place in the defense of the SS Panzer Corps' flank on July 8. The Ju 87G1 and Hs 129B greatly aided the German ground attack while the Germans held local air
superiority.24 However, the Red Air Force had risen from its ashes, like its ground counterpart,
and would hold air superiority as the rule rather than the exception for the rest of the war.
The Red Army did not field any new tanks in the Battle of Kursk but did employ vast
numbers of T-34 tanks. In fact, the Soviet Union was producing only the T-34 and KV families
of tanks at the time of Kursk. This was very different from the Germans who produced a large
number of dissimilar armored vehicles that did not have common parts. The smaller number of
models simplified the replacement parts situation, and greater industrial capacity coupled with
23
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the focused effort on two families of tanks allowed Soviet tank production to outpace German
tank production. Another factor that greatly added to the number of tanks available to the Red
Army, as well as to its operational flexibility, was Lend-Lease transportation vehicles from the
United States. The lavish number of trucks the Red Army received from the U.S. allowed great
mobility of infantry and logistics during movement-intensive operations. The Soviet Union did
introduce a new tank destroyer, the SU-152, in small numbers at the Battle of Kursk. The SU152 was a self-propelled 152mm howitzer, and it had devastating effects on German forces. The
SU-152 was able to defeat both the Tiger and the Elephant, which earned it the sobriquet "animal
killer."25
The Soviet Air Force, like the Luftwaffe, employed large numbers of new aircraft at
Kursk. The Yakovlev Yak 3 saw its first action there. The Yak 3 and the recently introduced
Yakovlev Yak 1M gave the Red Army Air Force fighter aircraft that were technologically
comparable to German aircraft. Because of these fighters, Soviet pilots were on equal footing
with their German counterparts. Moreover, there were 2,000 Soviet fighter aircraft in the Kursk
salient, which gave them a 5:1 numerical advantage over the Germans. The result was that the
Soviets enjoyed air parity or air superiority over Kursk for the most of the battle. In terms of
close air support, the ubiquitous Shturmovik also made its presence felt on the battlefields of
Kursk. The latest model was the Ilyushin Il-2m3 that had the additions of a rear gunner and
heavier armor. The Shturmovik, like the Stuka 87G-1, also had 37mm underwing cannon
capable of penetrating most German tanks. These new Shturmoviks destroyed many tanks
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during the Battle of Kursk, especially those of the 9th Panzer Division deployed against the
Central Front.26
The Wehrmacht would attempt to demonstrate that it was still the world's master of
mechanized warfare during Operation CITADEL. The German commanders wanted to use the
tactics that had brought them to the brink of European dominance, but there were many
impediments to successful execution of this style of warfare. Their foremost hindrance was the
lack of artillery. The artillery support forces on both the north and south face of the Kursk
salient were "extremely weak for a breakthrough through a positions system."27 To counter this
lack of artillery, General Model also used a questionable tactic, as he kept his armor back and
attempted to use his infantry to open gaps for tanks to exploit. This tactic, however, did not take
full advantage of mass and combined arms operations. His decision, coupled with the lack of
surprise and insufficient artillery support, degraded Ninth Army's offensive momentum on the
north face of the Kursk salient. The depth, breath, and density of the Soviet defense also forced
Army Group South to abandon the traditional hallmarks of the blitzkrieg. In other words, the
German tanks could not to penetrate the main defensive line and then wreak havoc in the
enemy's rear, so they attacked in armored waves.28 The Wehrmacht soldiers referred to these
armored waves as a Panzerkeil.
The Panzerkeil was a tank wedge consisting of Tiger tanks moving at the point of a
wedge with Panthers flanking them. Mark IIIs, Mark IVs, and Stug III assault guns followed the
26
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Panthers. Panzer grenadiers moved behind the tanks and assault guns. The German leaders
hoped that using a succession of Panzerkiels would create a penetration of the Soviet defenses,
as using the tanks alone against the Soviet prepared defenses would have been disastrous. The
Germans also made heavy use of Nebelwerfer, which was a six-barreled rocket launcher. The
Nebelswerfer’s main use was to obscure the attacking forces until the actual assault. This was a
German attempt to compensate for the prepared Red Army defenses. Nevertheless, using the
Panzerkeil was akin to using a sword like a club as the tanks attempted to bludgeon their way
through the Soviet defenses rather than creating a penetration and exploiting it. Furthermore,
this tactic often gave up the standoff advantage of the Tiger, as it had to close with the enemy in
order to protect the older tanks.29
The Red Army would challenge the notion that the Wehrmacht was the master of
mechanized warfare during its counterattacks in the latter stages of Kursk. The Soviet military’s
rediscovery and gradual perfection of Marshal Tuchashevsky's theories on deep battle made this
challenge possible. The Soviets would first, however, attempt to prove that it was the master of
the prepared defensive battle, deploying massive amounts of direct fire and indirect fire weapons
to defend the Kursk salient. Red Army leaders integrated artillery, mortars, rocket artillery, and
anti-tank guns of all calibers into the defensive scheme. In fact, for the first time during the war
a Soviet defense had one and a half times more artillery regiments than it had infantry regiments.

your forces at once. General Guderian's actions in the opening stages of the Polish Campaign are a good example of
this. Heinz Guderian, Panzer Leader, p. 68.
29 Ailsby, SS Hell, p. 74; Clark, Barbarossa, pp. 330-331; Jukes, Kursk, p. 92; Glantz and House, Kursk, p.
94; Michael Woodgerd, "If You Don't Like This, You May Resign And Go Home: Commanders' Considerations In
Assaulting A Fortified Position," p. 66. Mr. Woodgerd telephonically interviewed Mr. Arnold Friesen who fought
at Kursk as a 17 year-old SS Officer Candidate Tiger tank platoon leader.
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There was also an intense effort to bring all units in the salient up to full strength. 300,000 local
civilians also aided the defensive preparations.30
The Central Front’s defensive sector alone was staggering, consisting of six main lines of
defense with intermediary lines, switch positions, communication trenches, and battalion centers
of resistance for all-round defense. General Rokossovsky's Front dug 5,000 kilometers of
trenches and planted 400,000 mines and ground bombs. The two armies within Central Front
that bore the brunt of the German Ninth Army onslaught, the 13th and the 70th, had 112
kilometers of barbed-wire, 10.7 kilometers of electrified wire, and more than 170,00 mines
planted in their sectors. The Stavka allotted almost half of its reserve artillery regiments and 4th
Breakthrough Artillery Corps to 13th Army alone.31
Vatutin's Voronezh Front prepared his sector in a similar manner to Rokossovsky's
Central Front. Confidant that the German Ninth Army would make the primary effort of the
overall German attack in the north, Vatutin had anticipated a comparatively weak attack against
his part of the salient. He was mistaken. Von Manstein's German forces in the south were larger
and more powerful than Model’s Army in the north. Furthermore, the mobile divisions attacking
the Voronezh Front were the elite of the Wehrmacht and Waffen SS. Nevertheless, both the
Central and the Voronezh Fronts had an average density of between 2,400 and 2,700 mines per
1.6 kilometers, which were six times that of the defense at Moscow, and four times that of
Stalingrad. The preparation of the Central Front and the Voronezh Front was only the beginning
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of the defensive network for the entire salient. The Soviet defenses in the Kursk salient had an
overall depth of 110 miles with eight distinct lines including the defenses of the Steppe Front.32
Soviet anti-tank defenses within the Kursk salient were formidable. Soviet leaders
saturated the best avenues of approach with artillery and anti-tank weaponry to repel
concentrated German armor attacks. For example, the Voronezh Front created nearly a hundred
special defensive positions known as PTOP’s (protivotankovye opornye punkty) to destroy and
disrupt German armored operations. "The strongpoints, as a rule, were allocated between three
to five guns each, up to five anti-tank rifles, and two to five mortars between a section, a platoon
of sappers, and a section of submachine-gunners. On the most important axes, the anti-tank
strongpoints had up to 12 guns each."33 In addition to PTOP’s, the Red Army formed antitank
regions within the defense comprising separate tank brigades, tank regiments, and self-propelled
gun regiments kept in reserve to deliver local counterattacks or reinforce rifle regiments. The
Soviet units also conducted extensive anti-tank training, which included firing artillery pieces in
the direct fire mode and daily infantry company exercises. Even the political commissars
worked with the soldiers to train them in these military skills instead of attempting to instill
Communist dogma. In fact, the soldiers were to know the best way to destroy German armor
better than they had known the Lord's Prayer.34
Red Army engineers also played a significant role at Kursk. During the preparation
phase, they supervised or executed the emplacement of the minefields, obstacle belts, and
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defensive belts. They also formed new sapper units and mobile obstacle detachments, which had
the mission to emplace minefields to hamper the movement of tanks during the fighting. These
detachments remined areas the Germans had previously cleared, reinforced minefields that were
in imminent danger of assault, and emplaced new obstacles that would channel the attacking
Wehrmacht units into Soviet engagement areas. The mobile obstacle detachments and the
sapper units both trained extensively with tanks.35
The summer of 1943 would renew the contest for strategic initiative between the Axis
and the Allies, but this battle would be especially important on the Russo-German front. Both
the Wehrmacht and the Red Army were prepared to renew the contest of wills between Adolf
Hitler and Joseph Stalin, as well as the life-and-death struggle between the German people and
the Soviet people. The Wehrmacht had brought its attacking forces up to the maximum
readiness and lethality that the Reich could muster. Similarly, the Red Army used all of the
motherland’s resources to create a defense of dizzying intricacy, a deadly web of kill sacks and
anti-armor pakfronts.
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CHAPTER 4
THE BATTLE BEGINS
The first stage of the Battle of Kursk began on July 4, 1943 with a German artillery
barrage, and this phase ended on July 12 before the Battle of Prokhorovka. General Walther
Model’s German Ninth Army attacked General Konstantin Rokossovsky’s Soviet Central Front
on the northern face of the Kursk salient, while von Manstein’s German Army Group South
simultaneously assaulted through the defensive works of General Nikolai Vatutin’s Soviet
Voronezh Front on the southern face of the salient. The German forces were well prepared for
the offensive, but the Soviets had created an intricate prepared defense to defeat the weight of
the Nazi onslaught. The resulting clash of arms was a bloody struggle of immense proportions
that would have an enormous impact on World War II.
Forewarned by ULTRA and LUCY intelligence, Rokossovsky and Vatutin put their units
on full alert starting on July 3. The tension heightened as soldiers stood ready behind their
weapons. Meanwhile, German pioneers, or combat engineers, removed mines in preparation for
the attack. In one case, approximately ten men of the 2nd Company of Grossdeutschland's
Assault Pioneer Battalion cleared 2,700 mines on the night before the attack, which says much
about the extent of the Soviet defensive preparation. The Battle of Kursk began on the night of
July 4, when elements of the II SS Panzer Corps successfully made preliminary attacks to gain
better terrain that would act as artillery observation points and as springboards for the general
assault the next day.1 In the waning moments before the general assault, German officers read
several Orders of the Day to their soldiers that stressed the decisive nature of the impending
1 Helmuth Spaeter, The History of the Panzerkorps Grossdeutschland, II, 113; Geoffrey Jukes, Kursk: The
Clash of Armour, p. 84; Rudolf Lehmann, The Leibstandarte III: 1 SS Panzer Division Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler,
Vol. III, 204; Theodor Busse, The Zitadelle Offensive, p. 24. An example of these operations was panzer
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operation. Operation CITADEL, Hitler proclaimed in one message, "would be decisively
important to the outcome of the war."2 In another, he stated that Operation CITADEL would
"shine out to the world like a beacon."3 Unfortunately for Hitler, that beacon would not
symbolize another "Triumph of the Will," but would mark the beginning of the military decline
of the Thousand Year Reich.
The battle began in earnest when Rokossovsky’s Front launched a pre-emptive artillery
barrage at 02:20 a.m. on July 5. The barrage disrupted the German units as they prepared for the
attack in densely packed assembly areas, but the German artillery countered with a previously
scheduled barrage at 04:30 a.m. Vatutin, like his comrade to the north, ordered his own preemptive artillery barrage at 02:30 a.m., disrupting the German preparations somewhat. Model's
artillery, like von Manstein's, countered with a barrage at 03:30 a.m.4 The Red Air Force
attempted to raid Luftwaffe airports in conjunction with the Red Army pre-emptive artillery
barrages; however, the German Freya radar detected the approach of the attacking Soviet
aircraft, allowing German fighters to intercept the attack. Shortly after these artillery and air
precursors, the German ground units launched the attacks for which both sides had been
preparing so long.5
In the attack zones of both Ninth Army and Army Group South, the German soldiers
quickly realized that they had completely underestimated the effectiveness of the Red Army
defenses. German planners knew that the Soviet defenders intended to rely on deep and wellgrenadiers of the 1st SS Panzer Grenadier Division Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler when they seized Hill 288.6 to
provide cover on its left flank.
2 James Lucas, Das Reich: The Military Role of the 2nd SS Division, pp. 103-104.
3 Albert Seaton, The Russo-German War 1941-45, p. 354.
4 Konstantin K. Rokossovsky, A Soldiers Duty, p. 195; Jukes, Kursk, p. 84; Paul Carrell, Scorched Earth:
The Russian-German War, 1943-1944, p. 34.
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fortified positions to hold onto Kursk and were willing to deploy tank forces close to the front,
but German intelligence did not foresee the level of fortification that confronted their ground
forces. The attack “proved to be a difficult affair, contrary to German expectations. Resistance
and other obstacles were stronger than expected."6 Despite the labyrinthine defenses and
consequent losses, the Wehrmacht units made early progress in both sectors. However, they did
not attain their objectives for the first day along either of the axes, since the objectives were far
too ambitious given the level of Soviet preparation.
Model's Ninth Army attacked with infantry as its first attack echelon and mechanized
units as the second attack echelon. The 20th Panzer Division was, in fact, the only panzer
division used with the first echelon of the attack. Model's primary opponent was Lieutenant
General N. P. Pukhov's 13th Army, which was well prepared and supported along the entirety of
its forty-kilometer long sector. Ninth Army met resistance that far exceeded their intelligence
calculations, which was probably due to the Soviet's incorrect assessment that the primary
German effort would be from the north. Model's soldiers made some small gains against
Rokossovsky's Central Front, but most attacks "ground to a complete standstill" or intense Red
Army defensive fire checked them. Moreover, the Red Air Force incessantly attacked the rear
areas of the German Ninth Army while it attempted to penetrate the Soviet lines. Model and his
subordinate leaders completed new plans while in contact, and reserve units were committed to
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the battle including Tiger tanks and Elephant self-propelled guns. With the additional support in
the 10-mile wide main attack zone, the German forces were able to make forward progress.7
The 6th Infantry Division, spearheaded by Tigers of the powerful Heavy Panzer Battalion
505, penetrated five kilometers and seized the village of Bobrik by the end of July 5. This small
gain by such an important and powerful German force demonstrated that the Wehrmacht would
have difficulty creating a penetration of the size necessary to significant exploitation.
Furthermore, the 254th and 148th Soviet rifle divisions inflicted heavy losses on the Germans by
repulsing the attack of XXIII Army Corps on the village of Maloarkhangelsk. Seizure of this
village was vital to protect Model's armor from counterattacking Soviet reserves. The night of
July 5 left Model with a lodgment fifteen kilometers wide and, at its greatest extent, eight
kilometers deep. Worse yet was the fact that, of the three hundred armored vehicles committed
to battle, two hundred had either had failed mechanically or Soviet troops destroyed them.
Model thus lost one fifth of his armored capability on the initial day of combat.8
General Rokossovsky redeployed his reserves on the night of July 5 in order to attack the
following day. The divisions of the 17th and 18th Guards Rifle Corps, with support from the
3rd, 16th, 19th, and 9th Tanks Corps, were to begin offensive operations at 5:30 a.m. on July 6 in
support of 13th Army. This plan was poorly coordinated and consequently only the 17th Guards
Rifle Corps and the 16th Tank Corps went over to the counteroffensive. The remainder of the
counterattack forces was either already too heavily engaged or was unable to move fast enough
to participate in the attack. Meanwhile, Model chose to commit the 2nd, 9th, and 18th Panzer
Divisions from his second echelon to the battle at the same time. The result was a furious tank
7
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battle that lasted for four days west and northeast of Ponyri Station.9 Because this area acted as
the linchpin of the Soviet main defensive belt, a German seizure of Ponyri Station might have
unhinged the entire Central Front defense. Consequently, the importance of the terrain and the
intense German pressure forced the Red Army leaders to commit their armored formations as
they were ready and in piecemeal fashion. The heavy Soviet tank losses also forced the Front
leaders to dig tanks in as part of pakfronts. By digging in, the tanks became little more than
pillboxes in a static defense rather than mobile forces. The Red Air Force was also making its
presence felt as assault aircraft engaged the attacking Germans and destroyed many tanks.10
The Fourth Panzer Army's two main units, the XXXXVIII Panzer Corps and II SS Panzer
Corps, faced Lieutenant General I. M. Chistyakov's 6th Guards Army. Initially, Fourth Panzer
Army "got off to a flying start, cutting through Vatutin's first line in two hours."11 However,
weather, terrain, and Soviet artillery quickly slowed the German units. It had rained nearly all of
the previous night, which had turned the roads and tracks into muddy quagmires. An additional
deluge on the morning of July 5 flooded the numerous gullies in the area, as the rain the night
before had saturated the ground. This created numerous water obstacles, and several of these
required bridging equipment. One particularly large flooded gully, in fact, halted the XXXXVIII
Panzer Corps for the better part of the day. Ironically, many of the Panthers that Hitler had
delayed the entire operation for were either out of commission due to maintenance problems or
Soviet anti-tank gunners destroyed them in swampy minefields.12
Intense Red Army artillery bombardment, in addition to the rugged Soviet defense and
poor weather, slowed the II SS Panzer Corps, which was on the right flank of XXXXVIII Panzer
9
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Corps. Once it had weathered the steel storm, which had been silenced by Stuka close air
support, the II SS Panzer Corps continued its attack. 1st SS Panzer Grenadier Division
Leibstandarte took Hill 220.5 by 11:30, but only after a bitter five-hour fight. Because of this
minor SS victory, Vatutin abandoned the first line of defense in favor of the second late on July
5. He also ordered two tank corps of the 1st Tank Army to move forward and assist in the
defense. Meanwhile, a furious air battle raged over the southern wing of the Battle of Kursk. In
terms of planes claimed shot down, this aerial engagement was unequalled even by the fighting
at the height of the "Marianas Turkey Shoot" in the Pacific in June-July 1944. Despite the heavy
fighting, von Manstein's group carved a penetration ten kilometers wide in the first Soviet line of
defense by the end of the first day.13
After regrouping, von Knobelsdorff's XXXXVIII Panzer Corps resumed the offensive on
the mid-morning of July 6, and Hausser's II SS Panzer Corps also renewed its attack early that
day. The XXXXVIII Panzer Corps was unable to reach its objective for July 6, the Psel River,
but it would be in a good position to do so on the following day. Meanwhile, the II SS Panzer
Corps advanced rapidly, but both panzer corps had steadily lost men and tanks. In fact, July 6
would be the worst single day of CITADEL for German tank losses.14 Nevertheless, the
XXXXVIII Panzer Corps had created three small pockets of Soviet forces by nightfall, but the
corps momentum was slowing. The II SS Panzer Corps, for its part, had not created any pockets
of Red Army units, but its headlong push was exposing its flanks. Because of this, the 3rd SS
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Panzer Grenadier Division Totenkopf was forced to screen the II SS Panzer Corps' right flank;
thus, the attack at Corps level was clearly not unfolding as intended.
Army Detachment Kempf's mission was simple yet crucial: protect the Fourth Panzer
Army's left flank as it attacked north to link up with Ninth Army. Kempf's forces, however,
could not do this if they lagged behind the Fourth Panzer Army. This became an issue almost
immediately. Kempf's Offensive progress was slow in part because most of the Luftwaffe close
air support and fighter protection went to the Fourth Panzer Army and Kempf's forces got little.15
On July 5, Breith's III Panzer Corps had managed to gain a small bridgehead over the Donets
River south of Belgorod. As a reaction to this threat, Vatutin reinforced Lieutenant General M.
S. Shumilov's 7th Guards Army with three rifle divisions. Vatutin hoped to keep Kempf's
formation pinned to the Donets bridgeheads that its units had created. Nevertheless, Kempf had
pushed east across the Donets in force by the end of July 6. Furthermore, the III Panzer Corps
had created two pockets of Soviet units. Unfortunately for Army Detachment Kempf, its units
were not faring as well as the Fourth Panzer Army had and were falling alarmingly behind from
the outset.
Ninth Army renewed its attempt to breakthrough the Soviet defenses on July 7. This
fight still revolved around Ponyri Station, and General Model hoped that once this area fell, the
elusive breakthrough to Kursk would follow. The fighting between the village of Soborovka and
Ponyri included over 2,000 armored fighting vehicles from both sides, and Model's forces still
could not break the Soviet defense. Ninth Army would later refer to Ponyri Station as "the
Stalingrad of Kursk" because of the savage house-to-house fighting that occurred and the five
futile attacks by the 18th Panzer and the 292nd Infantry Divisions. Model chose to expand the
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breadth of his assault from the previous one on the 6th when he had "3,000 guns and mortars,
5,000 machine-guns, and over 1,000 tanks" packed into a six-mile attack sector. He did this in
the hopes of finding a weakness and to draw some of Rokossovsky's reserves elsewhere.16
However, moving his point of attack would have been more sound than widening his attack, as it
would have allowed Model to retain as much striking power as possible, hopefully gain some
tactical surprise, and continue to hold the initiative.
While Model prepared to renew the attack, General Rokossovsky prepared to thwart the
renewed German offensive. He reconstituted his reserves by moving an entire division from
Lieutenant General Chernyakhovsky's 60th Army and two tank regiments from Lieutenant
General Batov's 65th Army closer to Ponyri.17 The Central Front Commander also ordered
Lieutenant General Rodin's tanks to dig in up to their turrets for the following three reasons: the
failed counterattack on July 6 forfeited a large number of tanks and digging in would help protect
the remainder, the German tank crews were utilizing their stand-off range to destroy Soviet tanks
and digging in would afford the tank crews some cover and concealment, and the sheer number
of first echelon defensive tank losses was a cause of great concern.18 In this manner,
Rokossovsky's Central Front prepared to repel Model's Ninth Army.
On July 8, Model had his armored forces attack on three major axes—toward Teploye,
Olkhovatka, and Ponyri. He also committed the fresh 4th Panzer Division to seize the village of
Teploye and Hill 272. In short order all three attacks confirmed his worst fears about the Soviet
defense in the Kursk salient. Ninth Army barely managed to push the Soviets defenders out of
16
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the village of Teploye, and Rokossovsky countered that small victory by committing the 140th
Rifle Division and 11th Guards Tank Brigade to stabilize the situation. This reinforcement
prevented the 4th Panzer Division attempt to push the Soviets off the key Hill 272. Similarly,
the elements of the 2nd Panzer, 20th Panzer, and 6th Infantry Division were unable to seize Hill
274 in Olkhovatka and never would. Savage streetfighting, or rattenkrieg as the Germans called
it, continued at Ponyri Station, but the Soviet 307th Division defenders held tenaciously to the
high ground—Hill 253.5.19 Model's Ninth Army was slowly bled white with little to show for its
efforts except burning tanks and dead soldiers on the steppe.
The II SS Panzer Corps continued its rapid advance north and northeast with the 1st SS
Panzer Grenadier Division in the vanguard. Leibstandarte took the village of Lutschki in the
early morning hours and continued its advance north, despite heavy resistance by Vatutin's
infantry and armor, towards the village of Tetrevino. The SS attack badly shook Vatutin's
forces, but the Red Army soldiers continued to hold onto the shoulders of the penetration.
Furthermore, the 5th Guards Tank Army, 2nd Tank Corps, and 10th Tank Corps were en route to
Voronezh Front to halt the German penetration. The Red Army also mounted many tactical
counterattacks, but the Wehrmacht units were able to brush them off with tough defensive
fighting and excellent Luftwaffe support. It is important to note that Totenkopf was unable to
gain enough ground to link up with Army Detachment Kempf. The Red Army preventing the
linkup of the II SS Panzer Corps and Army Detachment Kempf is a seemingly minor Soviet
victory, but it would have great ramifications later in the battle.
Despite Totenkopf's setback, the II SS Panzer Corps was able to seize the village of
Tetrevino by the evening of July 7. This action ruptured the Sixth Guards Army's second
19
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defensive belt and exposed a very thin screen of Soviet forces to the northwest. At this point von
Manstein ordered the Fourth Panzer Army to turn east, occupy the land bridge at Prokhorovka,
and defeat the massive Soviet reserves that would undoubtedly be attacking II SS Panzer Corps'
eastern flank.20
To the west the XXXXVIII Panzer Corps was also tearing away at Vatutin's defense.
The Grossdeutschland Panzer Grenadier Division successfully seized the village of Dubrova.
General Hoth then ordered the XXXXVIII Panzer Corps to attack toward Oboyan, as originally
ordered in Operation CITADEL's operations plan and to protect the II SS Panzer Corps left flank
as it attacked toward Prokhorovka. Despite the expansion of the original mission to include
protecting the SS Corps' flank without additional resources, the attack continued to go well for
von Knobelsdorff's solders. Elements of Grossdeutschland first took Dubrova on the morning of
July 7 and veered northwest. The attack of Grossdeutschland successfully linked the XXXXVIII
Panzer Corps with the II SS Panzer Corps near the village of Iakovlevo by the end of the day.21
Despite the reunion of the Fourth Panzer Army's two panzer corps, the deploying tanks of
the 31st Tank Corps forced Leibstandarte to detach additional forces to face them. In a similar
manner, Das Reich spread out to extend Totenkopf's flank as well as the flanks of the Corps and
the entire the Fourth Panzer Army.22 This is an example of how the coordination within the
Fourth Panzer Army was unraveling, and, worse still, how coordination between the Fourth
Panzer Army and Army Detachment Kempf was deteriorating.
The II SS Panzer Corps would continue the attack on July 8 by massing Leibstandarte
and Das Reich to complete the destruction of the Soviet forces preventing forward progress,
derisive term the German soldiers used for urban fighting. It roughly translates to war of the rats.
20 Lehmann, Leibstandarte, III, 217-218; Cross, Citadel, p. 201; Glantz and House, Kursk, pp. 109, 121; C.
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while Totenkopf spent most of the day awaiting relief from 167th Infantry Division. Once
relieved, Totenkopf would continue the attack with the rest of the Corps.23 Simultaneously,
General Vatutin scoured the Voronezh Front for additional forces to block the twin advance of
the XXXXVIII and the II SS Panzer Corps. He was able to shift the 6th Tank Corps to the east
in an effort to slow the German advance toward Oboyan. Vatutin also prepared the 10th Tank
Corps to counterattack the II SS Panzer Corps "on the nose" with supporting counterattacks by
the 11th Motorized Rifle Brigade, remnants of 52nd Guards Rifle Division, 5th Guards Tank
Corps, and 2nd Guards Tank Corps. However, these counterattacks were very poorly
coordinated and resulted in piecemeal defeat of each of the attacking elements, severe
causalities, and great loss of vehicles.24
In the XXXXVIII Panzer Corps zone, the Grossdeutschland Panzer Grenadier and 3rd
Panzer Divisions continued their attack north on the east bank of the Pena River throughout the
day. They were able to capture the well defended village of Sirtsevo by mid-afternoon. Von
Knobelsdorff gave orders during the night of July 8 for new attacks the following day. The
Grossdeutschland Panzer Grenadier and 11th Panzer Divisions were to advance five kilometers
and seize Hill 260.8. Subsequently, Grossdeutschland was to outflank and, in conjunction with
the 3rd Panzer and 332nd Infantry Divisions, destroy the 6th Tank Corps that threatened the
Corps' left flank. The first portion of the assault went well as the two panzer divisions succeeded
in taking the high ground, the town of Verkhopenye, and Verkhopenye's bridge across the Pena
River. However, the advance of the XXXXVIII Panzer Corps would subsequently slow because

22

Lehmann, The Leibstandarte , III, 222-224; Glantz and House, Kursk, p. 125.
Ailsby, SS Hell, p. 75.
24 Glantz and House, Kursk, pp. 134-135.
23

48

of timely repositioning of the 6th Tank Corps elements and intense Soviet resistance.25 Due to
the stiff Soviet defense and signs of slowing offensive operations, von Manstein should have
ordered General Nehling's XXIV Panzer Corps begin to move north from the Kharkov area to be
close enough to the battle for use and to maintain the momentum of his attack.
To the south and east, the III Panzer Corps was heavily engaged and making slow
progress toward its objective of penetrating the Soviet 7th Guards Army. On July 7, the 6th
Panzer Division, 7th Panzer Division, and 503rd Heavy Panzer Detachment had managed to
advance to the key road junction at Miasoedovo. General Shumilov, Commander of the 7th
Guards Army, committed the 92nd Guards Rifle Division, 94th Guards Rifle Division, and 96th
Tank Brigade to block the German advance. Despite this, elements of the 6th Panzer Division
and 503rd Detachment advanced rapidly to the town of Melikhovo on July 8. Shumilov, with
Voronezh Front's permission, countered by committing the 305th Rifle Division from the 69th
Army in order to stem the German onslaught. Thus, the III Panzer Corps made progress but was
unable to cross the Lipvyi Donets River into the rear of the Soviet defenses.26
On the night of July 8, Red Army leaders knew that Model's attack had essentially failed,
and the Soviet counterattack on the Orel salient was fully prepared and would begin soon. They
also knew that General Konev's powerful Steppe Front was prepared to make its presence felt on
the battlefield. To reverse the German success in the Voronezh Front area, the Stavka detached
Lieutenant General Pavel Rotmistrov's 5th Guards Tank Army from the Steppe Front and
attached it to the Voronezh Front and ordered Rotmistrov to accelerate his move toward
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Prokhorovka. Rotmistrov was to have forward elements in position west of Prokhorovka by July
10. The Stavka also put Zhadov's Fifth Guards Army under Vatutin's control.
General Hoth also made fateful decisions on the night of July 8. He needed to maintain
and increase the momentum of his attack. To do this end, he ordered the XXXXVIII Panzer
Corps to have the Grossdeutschland, 3rd Panzer, and 332nd Infantry Divisions attack to the
corps' left flank to deal with the persistent armored threat from that quarter. He ordered
Grossdeutschland and the 11th Panzer Division to subsequently link up with the II SS Panzer
Corps and continue the advance. The II SS Panzer Corps would then attack northward with
Leibstandarte and Totenkopf in the van with Das Reich and the 167th Division protecting the
Corps' flank. To support this thrust, von Manstein assigned all available close air support
missions to support the II SS Panzer Corps. 27 Unfortunately for the German cause, von
Manstein had not ordered the XXIV Panzer Corps into a position where it could sustain the
attack, if needed.
The fight for Ponyri continued in stalemate, but General Model planned yet another
attack to seize the village. On the night of July 10, he replaced the 292nd Division, which was a
mere shell of an infantry division by this point, with the fresh 10th Panzer Grenadier Division.
This division had powerful organic artillery in the form of seven artillery battalions, a
Nebelwerfer regiment, a heavy mortar battalion, and an assault-gun battalion. However, this
reinforcement proved futile as Model's forces were unable to seize Ponyri. Soviet ground attack
aircraft from the Sixteenth Air Army began to pound the exposed German tanks as the Red Army
fighters had driven the Luftwaffe from this sector. Thus, the German Ninth Army never
penetrated south of the city of Olkhovatka, an obvious Soviet victory of arms. The Ninth Army
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had clearly reached its culminating point as it was exhausted and Model had employed its last
reserve. In fact, Model's forces would sow defensive minefields the following morning.28
In the south, the XXXXVIII Panzer Corps attacked on the morning of July 9 with more
than 500 tanks in a 10-mile front. This action was another attempt to create a penetration toward
Oboyan. The Soviet 1st Tank and 6th Guards Armies continued to contest this advance very
effectively, as they had fallen back into prepared positions in the second prepared defensive line.
Furthermore, the Germans encountered the SU-122 and SU-152 assault guns, which had the
mobility and firepower to challenge any German tank. The Wehrmacht advance in the south was
slowing appreciably due to the tough Red Army defense. Despite this, the German vanguard
was within twelve miles of Oboyan by the end of July 9 and was close to gaining a foothold over
the Pena River, which the Red Army was desperately striving to prevent.
In the east, the II SS Panzer Corps continued to penetrate into Soviet territory by pushing
both north and east-northeast in the direction of Prokhorovka. The XXXXVIII Panzer Corps
also pushed due north. The II SS Panzer Corps, attacking abreast, destroyed the shattered
remnants of the 3rd Soviet Mechanized Corps and pushed the 31st Tank Corps back to
Kochetovka. This attack was especially difficult as it struck one of the Soviet prepared
defensive lines. Meanwhile, elements of Totenkopf reached the Psel River on July 9. These
German advances came at a large price, as local commanders ordered Soviet reinforcements into
the white-hot battlefield. These Red Army reinforcements destroyed the highest number of
German tanks in one day since July 6. However, the German attacks from July 7 to July 9
destroyed over 500 Soviet tanks in three days, which was the largest loss in a similar period
during the Battle of Kursk as a whole. These statistics show the ferocity of the fighting as well
28
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as the desperate struggle for the initiative. In fact, this would be one of the most important
factors in Hoth's decision to regroup his forces and push toward Prokhorovka; a direction that he
felt was the path of least resistance.29
After changing the direction of the main attack, the II SS Panzer Corps moved forward
without encountering any enemy resistance; however, events on the western flank of the Fourth
Panzer Army continued to raise concern at both Hausser's and Hoth's headquarters. Von
Knobelsdorff unleashed the full force of his armor toward the village of Novoselovka on the
previous day, yet the Soviets still held it in the morning of July 10. The XXXXVIII Panzer
Corps attacks began anew the following day with the 11th Panzer Division, supported by
Grossdeutschland in the west and Leibstandarte in the east, seized Hill 260.8 south of
Novoselovka. The bitter Soviet resistance forced Grossdeutschland to take over for the 11th
Panzer Division shortly after it took Hill 260.8. Later the same day, the 11th Panzer Division
also managed to take Hill 244.8. Hill 244.8 was the deepest point of penetration on the
Belgorod-Kursk axis during the Battle of Kursk.30
As the II SS Panzer Corps threatened to make a major breakthrough, the Soviets
committed several of their reserve units. Marshal Zhukov dispatched both Lieutenant General
A. S. Zhadov's Fifth Guards Combined Arms Army and Lieutenant General Pavel Rotmistrov's
Fifth Guards Tank Army to close the gap that Hoth's armored forces had torn in Vatutin's sector.
These two formations would take some time to get to the battlefield as the Konev had positioned
them to the east as a strategic reserve for the southern portion of the Soviet Union. Even more
disconcerting for the Soviets was that Zhadov and Rotmistrov's had expected to counterattack on
German rocket launcher
29 Ulrich Elfrath and Horst Scheibert, Panzers in Russia: German Armoured Forces on the Eastern Front, p.
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July 12, but the German attack precluded this preplanned counteroffensive. More problematic
was that 2nd Tank Corps had also suffered heavy losses already and Rotmistrov had planned to
use this unit to counterattack on the 12.31 However, the German plans were also going awry.
Kempf was too far behind schedule "to intercept the Soviet Fifth Guards Tank Army, prevent it
from linking up with Katukov's Army, and thereby keep Hoth's flank free."32 The III Panzer
Corps finally broke through the Soviet defenses on the evening of July 10, but the previous delay
would have grave implications for the II SS Panzer Corps at Prokhorovka.33
Von Manstein had a conference with Kempf and Hoth on the morning of July 11. It was
apparent that the enemy was committing strategic reserves and the key German leaders assumed
that the enemy had sustained considerable losses so far. Von Manstein, Kempf, and Hoth
decided that it was important not to let up. They discussed the following question: should the
attack continue considering the condition of the German troops, the strength of the enemy, and
Model’s stalled attack. Kempf was in favor of completely suspending offensive operations,
while Hoth wished to continue the attack with limited objectives. Specifically, Hoth favored
destruction of the enemy located south of the Psel River by a coordinated attack by both armies.
This conference, despite Kempf's reservations, confirmed for von Manstein to continue the
attack. To this end, he ordered Kempf to provide whatever support he could to the II SS Panzer
Corps for the decisive engagement at Prokhorovka. Von Manstein hoped that the two forces
could link up, but this would be very difficult given the level of Soviet resistance.34
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If von Manstein had already pre-positioned the XXIV Panzer Corps behind the Fourth
Panzer Army, he could have committed it to the attack on the morning of July 12 to sustain the
offensive. He had three major options for its employment. First, the XXIV Panzer Corps could
have attempted to break through the Soviet defenses toward Oboyan. Nehling's Corps would
have entered combat between the XXXXVIII Panzer Corps and the II SS Panzer Corps. In this
case, the XXIV Panzer Corps would have attempted to create a penetration of the Soviet lines
and thereby usher in the exploitation towards Kursk. Meanwhile, the II SS Panzer Corps would
hold the Steppe Front reinforcements moving west, the XXXXVIII Panzer Corps would continue
to attack the Soviet forces on the Fourth Panzer Army's west flank, and the III Panzer Corps
would continue its attempt to linkup with the II SS Panzer Corps. The second option was for the
XXIV Panzer Corps to have attempted to attack from the II SS Panzer Corps sector east toward
Prokhorovka and then assumed the defensive upon contact with a superior Soviet force. This
would have allowed the II SS Panzer Corps to focus on attacking north toward Oboyan while a
force with sufficient combat power protected its flank. Von Manstein's third option for the
XXIV Panzer Corps was to introduce it in the III Panzer Corps sector to rapidly complete the
linkup of Kempf's forces with elements of the Fourth Panzer Army. Subsequently, the XXIV
Panzer Corps would have assumed a defense upon contact with a superior Soviet force attacking
from the east. Of these options, the second seems most attractive because, as a general rule,
commanders employ reserves in the offense to reinforce success and the II SS Panzer Corps was
more successful than the other Corps in this regard. This option would have also allowed the II
SS Panzer Corps time to regroup and then attack north.
The situation was so tense that Stalin had both the Central and the Voronezh Fronts
submit hourly situation reports and had reserves moved into blocking positions rather than using
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them in a counterattack role. He also ordered Marshal Vasilevsky to remain with and coordinate
the efforts of Fifth Guards Tank Army and Fifth Guards Army. Additionally, Stalin also ordered
that the 27th Army with 4th Guards Tank Corps moved to Kursk and 53rd Army with 4th
Mechanized Corps repositioned to the southeast of the city. Vatutin also reinforced the Fifth
Guards Tank Army with the 2nd Tank and 2nd Guards Tank Corps, which brought Rotmistrov's
tally to 950 tanks. However, Rotmistrov had only 35 heavy tanks and self-propelled guns within
his army and 264 of his tanks were light models; thus, the majority of his tanks were not suited
to engage the German tanks they would face.35
Kempf's forces continued to press their attacks in order to link up with the II SS Panzer
Corps near Prokhorovka. German leaders still hoped that the two forces would link up in time to
destroy the Stavka reserves moving west. To increase the numbers of tanks available to aid the
link up effort, the 198th Infantry Division relieved the 7th Panzer Division late on July 11. This
freed the 7th Panzer Division to join with the rest of the III Panzer Corps push, which now
totaled roughly 300 tanks and armored assault guns. Shortly thereafter, 600 tanks and armored
assault guns of the II SS Panzer Corps tore through the Soviet forces screening the town of
Prokhorovka. Shortly thereafter, the SS men met the leading edges of Fifth Guards Tank Army
before Rotmistrov’s planned counterattack could be prepared. The Red Army forces fought
desperately to stabilize the situation and defeat the SS Panzer Corps before the III Panzer Corps
could join the battle from the south. The result was a "cycle of back-and-forth fighting" along
the whole line of contact. Consequently, the II SS Panzer Corps would have to reorganize and
conduct an assault to take Prokhorovka the following day.36
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Marshal Vasilevsky was orchestrating the defense of Vatutin and Rotmistrov and he
planned a counterattack for July 12 to thwart the German drive on Prokhorovka. To this end,
Vatutin ordered Rotmistrov to counterattack at 1000 hours on July 12 in the direction of the
Komsomolets State Farm and Pokrovka. Rotmistrov's forces would fight in cooperation with 5th
Guards and 1st Tank Armies for this attack, whose purpose was to destroy the enemy and
prevent his withdrawal to the south.37 Vatutin also ordered a counterattack against the
XXXXVIII Panzer Corps to the east.
While Red Army leaders prepared these new counterattacks, von Manstein ordered
Nehling's XXIV Panzer Corps to move up to the vicinity of Kharkov so that this corps could
exploit any major success. XXIV Panzer Corps began moving from the Donbas in the evening
of July 10 with orders to move to Belgorod. However, the OKH had not yet released the
divisions that made up the Nehling's Corps, the 5th SS Panzer Grenadier Division Wiking and
17th Panzer Division, for general use.38 This was overall a case of too little too late by von
Manstein. Because of the tardiness of his decision, Army Group South's reserve would not be
present on the battlefield when it was needed most; thus, the II SS Panzer Corps would be left to
fight the critical Battle of Prokhorovka with only its own resources.
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CHAPTER 5
PROKHOROVKA AND DENOUEMENT
The Battle of Prokhorovka was the decisive phase of the Battle of Kursk. This
engagement began on July 12, 1943, when General Hausser’s II SS Panzer Corps renewed its
efforts to break through the last line of Soviet defenses to the city of Kursk. Meanwhile, General
Rotmistrov’s Soviet Fifth Guards Tank Army and Zhadov’s Fifth Guards Army counterattacked
west, straight into the II SS Panzer Corps. The two huge formations struck just west of the
village of Prokhorovka. The resulting titanic battle was a tactical draw. The Germans, however,
left the field to the Soviets and strategic considerations in the Mediterranean and on the Eastern
Front resulted in Hitler's calling off the battle. Shortly thereafter, the Red Army went on the
counteroffensive in the Orel salient, north of Belgorod, and along the Mius River. Exhausted by
recent heavy fighting, the Wehrmacht was unable to resist and could only fall back.
The fighting at Kursk had led to the final confrontation at Prokhorovka, and the battle
centered on that small town would be the largest tank engagement of World War Two and one of
the largest in the Twentieth Century. The Wehrmacht and the Red Army had both envisioned
this fight for some time, as it was inevitable that the Soviet reserves from Steppe Front would
attack the eastern flank of the German attack. What the German and Soviet Army leaders did
not foresee with any certainty was exactly where and when the battle would take place. On July
12, the II SS Panzer Corps attacked toward Prokhorovka with the objective of breaking out to the
north, and Vatutin ordered a counterattack to prevent the II SS and III Panzer Corps from linking
up.
The battlefield was mostly west of the small village of Prokhorovka, as the meandering
Psel River formed its northern boundary, the Kursk-Belgorod railway cutting and hilly terrain
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unsuited for mechanized combat formed its southern boundary, and the town of Prokhorovka
acted as its eastern boundary.1 These boundaries delineated the battlefield quite well, which was
unusual for the open steppe of upper Donets River valley. However, the battlefield was very
muddy after the rains on July 11 and this hindered maneuver in some areas and made the
resupply of the forward-most SS units difficult.2
The forces that fought at Prokhorovka were immense. The Soviet armored force in the
engagement consisted of approximately 950 vehicles of various types including 501 T-34
medium tanks, 264 T-70 light tanks, and 35 British Churchill III medium tanks.3 The opposing
German armored force numbered approximately 300 vehicles in the II SS Panzer Corps and 200
vehicles in the III Panzer Corps. Most of these vehicles were Mark IV medium tanks with some
Tiger heavy tanks, new Panther medium tanks, and supporting assault guns. A total of 572
vehicles from both sides fought on the main battlefield west of Prokhorovka, with the remainder
fighting in compartmentalized areas demarcated by the Psel River, the Lipovyi River, the
Prokhorovka-Belgorod railroad cutting, and adjacent ridgelines.4
Hausser's three divisions began their attack on July 12 as planned, but the panzer
crewmen and panzer grenadiers did not know what awaited them. General Rotmistrov observed
the initial German wave of 200 tanks and supporting aircraft from his headquarters, which was
located on a hill to the southwest of Prokhorovka. The first echelon panzerkeil belonged to
Totenkopf, followed by armored wedges from Leibstandarte, and then Das Reich. With a short
artillery and Kaytusha barrage to disrupt the German attack and to cover their move, Rotmistrov
ordered the tanks of Fifth Guards Tank Army to attack with the sun at their backs, which made
1
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German target acquisition more difficult.5 The 18th Tank Corps, with the 170th Tank Brigade in
the van, attacked Leibstandarte from the north in the Petrovka-Prelestnoe area. The 29th Tank
Corps with infantry from the 9th Airborne Division also attacked Leibstandarte on either side of
the Prokhorovka-Belgorod rail cutting and from the vicinity of Prokhorovka. The resulting
battle was a furious tank melee "of proportions never before experienced."6 In fact, the fighting
was so violent that the Soviet tankers used ramming tactics. The Red Army tank commanders'
wanted to get in close to nullify the German tank qualitative superiority. Overall, the 29th Tank
Corps pushed the 2nd SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment back, but the Leibstandarte's Panzer
Regiment counterattack restored the situation.7
By 9 a.m. the bulk of the armor on both sides was in the fray and destroyed tanks littered
the battlefield. Fighter aircraft of the Red Army Air Force and the Luftwaffe vied for air
superiority over the battlefield to allow air power to influence the raging fight below. Despite
the aerial battle, some air support missions from both sides were able to destroy enemy armored
vehicles. The 18th Tank Corps launched a new assault against Totenkopf in the vicinity of
Andreevka. The Red Army tankers forced the SS men back but were unable to proceed any
further because of intense crossfire. This apparent stalemate allowed Soviet forces to smash into
Leibstandarte's left flank, which threaten to cut off the spearhead of the II SS Panzer Corps. The
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panzer grenadiers of Leibstandarte were able to mass enough defensive fires to destroy the
assaulting Red armor, and the 18th Tank Corps was forced over to the defensive.8
Leibstandarte faced yet another Soviet assault after having blunted two earlier. The 2nd
Tank Corps mounted an attack at roughly 11:45 a.m. near the village of Storozhevoe, which was
very close to Leibstandarte's southern boundary with Das Reich. Elements of the 2nd Tank
Corps were successful in penetrating the German defensive line, but the SS tanks and men
quickly repulsed the Red Army forces. In fact, the Waffen SS soldiers' counterattack 2nd Tank
Corps combat ineffective by 1:30 p.m. Das Reich similarly turned back the nearly simultaneous
attack of the 2nd Guards Tank Corps out of the Vinogradovka-Belenikhino area toward Iasnaia
Poliana and Kalinin.9
Despite the seesaw nature of the battle, Hausser ordered Totenkopf to attack out of the
Psel bridgehead, seize Hill 226, and attack toward Polezhaev. Elements of Totenkopf seized Hill
226 by 12:30 p.m., but they ran into two Soviet PTOP on the reverse slope. The fighting along
the frontlines continued throughout the afternoon. The Red Army continued to pound the open
left flank of the II SS Panzer Corps, as the III Panzer Corps had yet to arrive. The sheer weight
of the Soviet armored vehicles and the rising losses kept the II SS Panzer Corps on the
defensive.10
The III Panzer Corps, meanwhile, had succeeded in securing a firm bridgehead over the
northern Donets River in the morning of July 12. Breith ordered a kampfgruppe from the 19th
Panzer Division to prepare to assault the rear of the Fifth Guards Tank Army; however, the
Soviet Command took steps to prevent this. Vatutin ordered Rotmistrov to dispatch his reserve
8
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to deal with the possible panzer corps linkup. Consequently, Rotmistrov dispatched three
brigades under General Trufanov, his deputy, to contain and then eliminate the German
bridgehead. The counterattacking forces consisted of the 11th Mechanized Brigade and 12th
Mechanized Brigade from the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps and the 26th Guards Tank Brigade
from the 2nd Guards Tank Corps. These additional forces tipped the scales against the III
Panzer Corps and prevented a German linkup. At the same time their withdrawal forced the
remainder of the 2nd Guards Tank Corps to withdraw, consolidate, and reorganize.11 However,
if von Manstein had employed the XXIV Panzer Corps in the II SS Panzer Corps sector, its
pressure would probably have fixed Trufanov's forces in the Prokhorovka area. In this manner,
the III Panzer Corps would have had a greater chance of linking up with the Fourth Panzer Army
elements at Prokhorovka as planned. Similarly, if von Manstein had instead employed the XXIV
Panzer Corps to further Kempf's attack, the probability of Kempf's and Hausser's forces linking
up would have increased.
The close of July 12 brought more Soviet attacks, and General Hoth anticipated more
Red Army attacks to come, as his units were reporting Soviet reinforcements and replacements
all along the II SS Panzer Corps sector. Both Hoth and Rotmistrov felt that only the arrival of
Breith's III Panzer Corps would decisively swing the advantage to the Germans. Because
Breith's Corps was unable to push north, Totenkopf had the final action of the day as it
succeeded in cutting the Prokhorovka-Kartachevka road. Totenkopf's prospects of further
assault on Prokhorovka were grim, however, as the fresh 21st Tank and 10th Guards Mechanized
Brigades were prepared to stop any German advance toward Prokhorovka. Furthermore, Hoth
briefed von Manstein that there should be no further attacks to the north and that all available
10
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forces should be used to hit the enemy to the west. Thus, the largest tank engagement of the
World War Two ended with both sides holding while dealing their enemy hammer blows.
Neither had achieved its objectives—the Wehrmacht had not created the penetration of the
Soviet defenses necessary to exploit to Kursk, nor had the Red Army cut off and destroyed the II
SS Panzer Corps.12
Two enemy offensives had great impact on Adolf Hitler's decision making on continuing
Operation CITADEL. The Anglo-American invasion of Sicily on July 10, codenamed Operation
HUSKY, was the first. The preplanned Soviet counterattack in the Orel salient, codenamed
Operation KUTUZOV, was the second. KUTUZOV began on July 12. The combination of two
strategic counteroffensives put the German High Command in a quandary, as its strategic
reserves were, for the most part, already engaged in the Battle of Kursk. Either Hitler would
have to pull units out of CITADEL, or he would have to accept strategic risk with respect to his
enemies' new attacks.
Operation HUSKY began with elements of the 8th British Army and 7th U.S. Army
conducting an amphibious assault on Sicily’s southern shore. Before this invasion, general
opinion in Hitler's headquarters regarding Operation CITADEL and the situation on the Eastern
Front had been positive. The invasion of Sicily, however, appeared to Hitler and majority of the
other German senior leaders as the first step toward the feared invasion of Italy and then the
European continent. The poor Italian combat performance also exacerbated Hitler's strategic
fears and problems.13 He had already moved to reinforce the beach defense of Sicily with
German armor, which was unable to throw the Allies back into the water. Consequently, he had
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to order General Hube to conduct a phased withdrawal of German forces to the Italian mainland.
Moreover, this failure to defend Sicily put the Italian mainland in danger of falling to the Allies.
The potential end of Mussolini's empire, the possible loss of an old ally, and the apparent
defeat of Model's Ninth Army greatly alarmed Hitler. First and foremost, he felt that the
Mediterranean Theater needed more units to prevent any Allied landings on the continent and to
preserve his old Fascist partner. Hitler also feared that the Allies would attempt to open another
front in the Balkans, as Winston Churchill advocated. In order to bolster Italian Fascism, his
initial solution to these problems was to transfer politically reliable units to aid Mussolini's
regime. The problem was that these units were fighting at Prokhorovka at that time.
Consequently, Hitler chose to pull out the three premiere SS divisions from Operation CITADEL
to bolster the Italian defense.
Operation KUTUZOV opened on July 12 when General Sokolovsky's West Front moved
against the northern face of the Orel salient and when General Popov's Bryansk Front hurled
itself against northern and eastern portions of the Orel salient. This attack placed heavy pressure
upon General Rudolf Schmidt's Second Panzer Army and the rear of the already engaged Ninth
Army. Moreover, KUTUZOV threatened the supply base of the entire Army Group Center. At
the same time the Stavka coordinated a continuous, massive, and successful partisan effort
against the German lines of communication within the Orel salient.14 The combined pressure
forced the Ninth Army to cease offensive operations and reinforce the Second Panzer Army with
some of its best units. Hitler also gave General Model overall command of both the Ninth and
the Second Panzer Armies to complete an orderly withdrawal.
14
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The success of CITADEL had appeared very remote as Operation KUTUZOV ended any
ideas of continued attack from the northern face of the Kursk salient. From Hitler's perspective,
von Manstein's units had suffered substantial damage in sustained battles, and he did not want to
sacrifice more combat power with little or no chance of victory. The twin offensives of his
enemies would force Hitler to make a decision in short order.15
While the Allies were attacking in Sicily and Orel, von Manstein believed that the
offensive still had merit and requested that the OKH approve his employment of Nehling's
Panzer Corps to increase the power and impetus of his attack. Hitler briefly approved the release
of the XXIV Panzer Corps, while the German High Command debated the strategic situation.
Meanwhile, Leibstandarte and Das Reich attacked 18th Tank Corps west of Prokhorovka.
Rotmistrov countered by sending in the 10th and the 24th Mechanized Brigades, which were his
final reserves from his second echelon, to parry this new threat. The result was a confused and
deadly tank melee that was very similar to the previous day.
The losses from the fighting over July 12 and 13 were extensive on both sides. The
German forces destroyed a full 50 percent of Fifth Guards Tank Army during the two day fight.
More specifically, the Germans eliminated over 250 Soviet tanks with the heaviest losses coming
in the 18th Tank Corps, 29th Tank Corps, 2nd Guards Tank Corps, and 5th Guards Tank Corps.
The Red Army also damaged many Wehrmacht tanks, but a considerable number of these were
repairable. The German surrender of the field left these vehicles behind. However, the most
significant losses of German armor strength had already occurred prior to July 12 during the
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penetration of the Soviet fortifications. The Red Army, as it retained control of the battlefield,
repaired many of its damaged tanks and used them in subsequent counterattacks.16
Hitler ordered von Manstein and von Kluge to report to him at his command headquarters
in East Prussia on July 13. He expressed to them his reservations about Sicily, Italy as a whole,
the Soviet attacks in the Orel, and the growing indications of a Soviet attack against Army Group
South's weak right wing. Von Manstein argued not only for the continuation of the offensive in
his sector but for Model to resume the attack against the northern face of the Kursk salient as
well. Von Kluge, who had to contend with the Soviet Operation KUTUZOV, desperately
needed Model's units to shore up the crumbling Second Panzer Army. Despite von Kluge's
reservations, von Manstein convinced Hitler to allow him to continue the attack.17
Meanwhile, the German Ninth and Second Panzer Armies carried out a successful
retrograde movement back to the HAGEN LINE. This maneuver conceded that the northern
assault group had lost the ability to close its half of the encirclement, and, consequently, the
German forces no longer had the possibility of successfully completing Operation CITADEL as
originally envisioned. The German tanks and assault guns, which were hidden in pakfronts of
their own, took a heavy toll on the Red Army forces in KUTUZOV, destroying many of the 500
recently produced tanks of General Badanov's Fourth Tank Army.18
The Red Army showed signs of building up another offensive, but this one would come
along the Mius River to the south of the Kursk fighting. Even worse for Germany, intelligence
indicated that the forces that remained to defend the Mius River sector were insufficient to
16
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counter the Red Army forces that were preparing to attack. Hitler had dreaded this situation.
Not only were von Manstein’s forces that were attacking the southern shoulder of the Kursk
salient and the elements holding the Crimea now in jeopardy, but Soviet action threatened the
mineral resources in the Donbas that Hitler felt were vital to the German war effort. More
problematic, Hitler also knew that the 27th and 53rd Armies of Konev's Steppe Front, supported
by 4th Guards Tank Corps and 1st Mechanized Corps respectively began closing into assembly
areas around Oboyan. Similarly, the Soviet 47th Army moved behind the 7th Guards Army.19
This massive reinforcement of fresh units meant that there was little or no hope of further
German offensive success at Kursk. Because of the threat in the south and his doubt of
CITADEL's success, Hitler ordered the XXIV Panzer Corps back south to parry the threat.
The Soviets launched their counteroffensive along the Mius River on July 17. The
Southwestern Front, commanded by Colonel General Tolbukhin, attacked the heavily fortified
Mius River line defenses. Southwestern Front controlled five infantry armies, an air army, two
mechanized corps, three tank brigades and a cavalry corps. Southwestern Front's early success
forced von Manstein to draw off more forces from the southern face of the Kursk salient,
including the 23rd Panzer Division, the II SS Panzer Corps, and the aforementioned XXIV
Panzer Corps. Local counterattacks proved costly and ineffective against Tolbukhin's forces, but
the reinforcements managed to stop the Red Army offensive.20 However, this attack merely
drew the German mobile units away from the point of the next Soviet counterattack—Operation
RUMANTSYEV.
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The Stavka had originally envisioned the simultaneous launching of Operation
RUMANTSYEV and Operation KUTUZOV, but the ferocity of the fighting in the Voronezh
Front sector precluded this. RUMANTSYEV's objective was to counterattack and seize
Belgorod and Kharkov. Marshal Zhukov's vision was to achieve a rapid and deep penetration
with powerful assault groupings. The Red Army shrouded the entire operation by a massive
deception, or maskirovka, effort. On August 3 the Soviets launched the counterattack, which
caught the German forces off-guard strategically, operationally, and tactically. Von Manstein
and the OKH could not believed the Red Army forces that had just taken the brunt of the
CITADEL offensive could recover and go over to the offensive so quickly.
By the end of the first day of Operation RUMANTSYEV the Soviet First and Fifth
Guards Tank Armies broke through the second line of German defenses to a depth of fifteen
miles. These tank armies also demonstrated that the Red Army could successfully use them as
mobile groups, as these two armies advanced away from the combined arms armies, attacked the
German operational reserves, and attacked the flanks and rear of the main Wehrmacht defense
line. The German forces that Hitler had moved to counter the Mius River offensive were
countermarched to stop the latest Soviet attack. Red Army forces retook Belgorod on August 5
and the Steppe Front pierced the external defenses of Kharkov on August 13. Four days later the
fighting reached the suburbs of Kharkov. After a short period of bloody house-to-house
fighting, von Manstein ordered the city abandoned on August 22 in order to avoid losing the
army as Germany had lost Sixth Army in Stalingrad. Army Group South conducted this
withdrawal against the directions of the OKH. Even more ominous for the future of the
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Wehrmacht, Hitler very grudgingly gave von Manstein permission to withdraw behind the
Dneiper River on September 15.21
The strategic situation had greatly changed after the Battle of Kursk. The Red Army had
exacted an immense toll of German men and material during the initial defense, and their
counterattacks also dealt the Wehrmacht heavy blows all along Army Group South. The lead
Soviet elements also pushed the front 300 kilometers to the east of the summer 1943 start lines in
some areas and regained at total of 395,000 square kilometers of territory. The German forces
would never again mount a strategic offensive on the Eastern Front.22 The Red Army would
inexorably push west to Berlin for the rest of the war. Politically, the Axis minor partners began
to look for ways of disengaging from the war after Kursk. Moreover, the psychological impact
of the battle was immense. The German armed forces’ morale continued to decline and morale
plummeted within the Third Reich, as the Nazi propagandists were unable to hide yet another
German defeat from the German people. Conversely, the Red Army and Soviet Union’s morale
soared due to their latest feat of arms.
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CHAPTER 6
ASSESSMENT
The Battle of Kursk ended with both the German and Soviet forces with numerous
casualties and destroyed vehicles, but the Red Army had the strength to counterattack and push
the Wehrmacht west. On the other hand, the German Army did not have to the strength to hold
against the Soviets. To ascertain the validity of the von Manstein’s claim that Hitler threw away
a victory, however, one must conduct an assessment of both the Red Army and the Wehrmacht
forces involved. Additionally, one must address the questions of what von Manstein could have
accomplished and at what cost.
The myth of the "Lost Victory" would begin with Hitler's decision to halt the attack over
von Manstein's immediate protests. Von Manstein felt that he could still have achieved victory
in his sector. Territory did not interest the field marshal; indeed, the capture of additional Soviet
territory would probably have only worsened the German position. What he wanted was to
continue attacking in order to smash the enemy's armored reserves and consequently to prevent
their use in new offensives.1
Von Manstein's insistence on continuing the offensive raises the question of what would
renewed attacks have accomplished? He could have put greater emphasis on actions such as
reducing the Gostishchevo-Liski pocket with the added combat power of the XXIV Panzer
Corps, emphasizing retention of terrain to facilitate vehicle recovery, conducting a time-phased
withdrawal back to Belgorod, and releasing forces to other threatened areas when the retrograde
movement was complete. Similarly, this begs the question of what the German forces were
capable of accomplishing. Although they continued to be combat effective for several weeks of
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fighting after the halt order, the overall condition of the German forces in and around the Kursk
salient was marginal and precluded more attacks.
The soldiers in General O. von Knobelsdorff's XXXXVIII Panzer Corps had a low level
of readiness, having faced two weeks of continuous combat. The 3rd Panzer Division
continually lost ground in the face of enemy attacks that were similar to those that other units
were turning back. This division, in fact, had only thirty armored vehicles by July 17, and the
11th Panzer Division was in roughly the same shape. Grossdeutschland Panzer Grenadier
Division, however, was capable of offensive action and conducted operations after July 17 in
both the Orel salient and later after Hitler moved it back to Army Group South.2
General Breith's III Panzer Corps was in better condition than von Knobelsdorff's
XXXXVIII Panzer Corps, as it was engaged in less damaging combat than what had occurred on
other sectors of the battlefield. Part of Army Detachment Kempf, III Panzer Corps had not
attacked directly into the extensive Soviet echeloned defenses as other panzer units had. In fact,
Breith's troops had performed very well and, by using a clever deception operation, had managed
to gain a penetration across the Donets near Rzhavets. In the following drive to Prokhorovka,
the III Corps encircled a substantial group of Soviet forces in Gostishchevo-Liski area. This
pocket included the entire 69th Army and two independent tank corps.3
Because of its offensive capability, the most important German unit to analyze is
Hausser's II SS Panzer Corps. The three divisions that primarily made up this formation—the
1st SS Panzer Grenadier Division Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler, the 2nd SS Panzer Grenadier
Division Das Reich, and the 3rd SS Panzer Grenadier Division Totenkopf—had taken substantial
2
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losses of men and material but were still capable of minor offensive action. In fact, the panzer
regiment of Das Reich helped to form the Gostishchevo-Liski pocket by establishing contact
with the 7th Panzer Division of the III Panzer Corps on July 15. Thus, the SS Panzer Corps was
launching attacks until it withdrew under Hitler's orders. These offensive actions show that both
the SS Panzer Corps and the III Panzer Corps were still capable of combat operations prior to the
Hitler's halt order on the July 17.4 Nonetheless, the fight through the Red Army echeloned
defenses and the clash at Prokhorovka to the Soviets had drained resources and morale.
Any judgement concerning von Manstein's position must also consider the question of
reserve forces and their condition. Von Manstein had a significant unit that remained unused—
General W. Nehling's XXIV Panzer Corps. It had moved up from the Kharkov area to the
vicinity of Belgorod on July 10. The XXIV Panzer Corps consisted of two experienced
divisions—the 5th SS Panzer Grenadier Division Wiking and the 17th Panzer Division, which,
like all the others at the beginning of Kursk, were at full strength in men and material. Wiking,
however, had three panzer grenadier regiments instead of the usual two regiments; consequently,
its mechanized infantry strength was significantly greater than a regular panzer or panzer
grenadier division. Von Manstein, however, had not employed the XXIV Panzer Corps before
Hitler redirected it back to Isyum on July 16.5 Because of Hitler's decision, von Manstein lost
the availability of a powerful mobile formation that could have been very useful in the battle.
The regular infantry divisions that took part in the fighting sustained heavy damage.
Most lost one third of their troop strength over the course of the battle. One of the reasons was
that they were not fully equipped with modern anti-tank weapons and were consequently not
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well suited to deal with the Soviet armor. Because of this, the infantry divisions did not fare as
well as the panzer divisions when they attacked through the Red Army echeloned defenses.6
These losses would have large ramifications as the battle and the war continued, since infantry
replacements were simply not available to bring unit strength back up to normal levels.
In order to analyze Hitler's decision, we must examine what the withdrawn units did
elsewhere. In fact, most of the units that Hitler took away from Manstein's control on July 17
did not actually go to Italy. Hitler ordered Leibstandarte out of the fighting at Kursk to support
the counterattack of the Mius line and to later entrain for Italy. When Leibstandarte began rail
movement to Italy on August 3, its mission was to act as a core for the creation of a new and
more fervently Fascist Italian army that would bolster Benito Mussolini's crumbling empire.
While serving in this role, it only conducted anti-partisan operations in northern Italy. The
German Commanders did not even use Leibstandarte in halting the Allied advance in Italy. This
clearly was a waste of one of the German military's most potent units. The 1st SS Panzer
Grenadier Division would move back to the Eastern Front in November 1943.7 While
Leibstandarte was in Italy, the remainder of the II SS Panzer Corps remained in von Manstein's
Army Group and participated in the fourth and final battle for Kharkov.
Hitler also transferred the Grossdeutschland Panzer Grenadier Division, the strongest in
von Knobelsdorff's XXXXVIII Panzer Corps, to von Kluge's Center Army Group. Hitler gave
von Kluge this elite formation to help fight in the Orel salient.8 The Soviet attack into this area
had put great pressure on the Center Army Group, but von Manstein needed Grossdeutschland to
finish his offensive operations more than von Kluge needed it to make a retrograde movement.
6
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It would also take a large amount of time for Grossdeutschland to withdraw from the front line in
the south, move to the Orel salient, and then participate in any operations. Therefore, the critical
period in the Orel salient had passed by the time Grossdeutschland could make any substantial
contribution to von Kluge's withdrawal to the Hagen Line.9 Once von Kluge's Army Group was
back to this defensive position, the OKH transferred this unit back to von Manstein's control.
The remainder of the XXXXVIII Panzer Corps remained under von Manstein's command, but it
received little rest after the battle. Breith's III Panzer Corps remained in Army Group South in a
role similar to von Knobelsdorff's corps.
Hitler also took Nehling's XXIV Panzer Corps away from von Manstein. The two panzer
divisions that made up this corps had moved up behind Hoth's Fourth Panzer Army to prepare to
exploit any successes. Over von Manstein’s protests, Hitler ordered him to transfer the XXIV
Panzer Corps to reinforce the 1st Panzer Army, which was holding the right wing of Army
Group South and faced a major attack by two Soviet Fronts. What Hitler really sought with that
transfer was protection of Germany’s control of the Donets River basin. To this end, Nehling's
Panzer Corps fought on the Mius River line to counter a new Soviet offensive, but von Manstein
lost further operational flexibility. Hitler should have left Nehling's Corps under von Manstein's
control to facilitate the greatest concentration of combat forces possible to end the more
important battle.10
The condition of Soviet forces also has an immense impact on what von Manstein could
have accomplished. In this vein, the Red Army faced several problems after July 12. The
Wehrmacht had the 69th Army, 2nd Tank Corps, and 2nd Guard Tank Corps encircled in the
8
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Gostishchevo-Liski area, and this was the most serious Soviet issue. If the German Army
eliminated this group, a large amount of available Soviet combat power would be lost.
Similarly, liquidation of this pocket would have helped the Germans by improving the ratio of
combat power after the battle. The potential to destroy the units in this pocket was lost when
Hitler began the transfer of von Manstein's units.11 Thus, Hitler’s faulty decision making
assisted the Red Army by letting the units in the pocket escape to fight another day.
Another Red Army issue was that the heavy fighting severely depleted many units,
including Rotmistrov's 5th Guards Tank Army and Zhadov's 5th Guards Combined Arms Army.
For example, the Battle of Prokhorovka all but destroyed the 29th and 18th Tank Corps. Overall
Soviet tank losses reached 1500 vehicles or roughly half of the initial Soviet combat vehicles
within the Kursk salient. The Red Army, however, had the advantage of retaining the
Prokhorovka battlefield and was able to repair and cannibalize hundreds of vehicles. Soviet tank
strength went back up to 2750 vehicles by August 3 due to the repair of damaged vehicles.
Replacing experienced tank crews was a difficult problem, but sheer numerical superiority
would prove too much for the Germans after Kursk. Soviet industry was also producing about
three times the number of front-line tanks that the Third Reich was turning out.
The Stavka had committed a significant portion of Soviet reserves during the course of
Kursk, including much of Konev's Steppe Front. One of the best infantry armies, Fifth Guards
Army under Zhadov, had been employed with the Fifth Guards Tank Army and two attached
independent tank corps. In fact, Konev only controlled three out of his original eight armies at
the end of the Battle of Prokhorovka. The units he still controlled were 27th Army with 4th
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Guard Tank Corps, 53rd Army with 1st Mechanized Corps, and 47th Army. Konev had
protested the piecemeal employment of his unit but using his Armies as reinforcements proved to
be one of the best decisions in the battle.12 After the Germans began their withdrawal, Konev
would take control of the sector of the front to the south of Vatutin for the counterattack phase.
Moreover, Zhukov could have used the three armies that Steppe Front still controlled as
reinforcements anytime during the Battle of Kursk, and they were in immediate supporting
distance. These armies were approximately fifty miles to the east of the battlefield; thus, they
would take roughly one day to reinforce any threatened Soviet sector.
Once the Germans broke through the initial Soviet defenses, combat results favored the
Wehrmacht. While it is true that the engagement severely weakened the involved units on both
sides, the German units were able to maintain their tank strength at a nearly constant level after
the first three days of fighting. The number of available German tanks after the battle at
Prokhorovka remained at a relatively steady state, and the panzer units involved had been
attacking for nine days at that point. Similarly, Hoth's Fourth Panzer Army was able to take
enemy territory throughout the Battle of Kursk, but the width of penetration steadily decreased
as its depth increased. Thus, it was not beyond the ability of Army Group South to have
continued holding operations while the uncommitted XXIV Panzer Corps reduced the 69th
Army.13
The Germans could not have attained the outcome they needed to bring Operation
CITADEL to a successful conclusion. They could no longer pinch off the Kursk salient due to
the local pressure of the Orel offensive, the threat of an impending offensive on the Mius River,
and the remaining commitment of additional reserves. The Allied invasion of Sicily also took
12
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Hitler’s attention away from Kursk, and he made units redeploy to Italy. This, of course,
weakened the effort at Kursk. The German units were also too exhausted and too damaged to
contemplate driving deeper into Soviet territory, or to take all the territory south of the Psel
River, as von Manstein advocated, would not have been possible. Holding the German position
on the southern portion of the Kursk salient without removal of forces, however, would have
improved the situation. If von Manstein had forced the surrounded Red Army units to surrender,
it would have weakened the Soviet counteroffensive plans to some degree. For example,
reducing the Gostishchevo-Liski pocket would have eliminated the 69th Army. The Second
Tank Corps and the Second Guards Tank Corps were also in the same pocket. Destroying these
two experienced Soviet tank corps, which together were approximately equal in numbers of
tanks to four panzer divisions, and an entire infantry army, which had an approximate strength of
50,000 men, would have greatly weakened overall Soviet strength. In fact, the Soviet General
Staff Study on the Battle of Kursk stated that if the Germans had accomplished this, it would
have set the conditions to successfully extricate the German Fourth Panzer Army from the battle.
Eliminating these units would have helped the German cause, but would not have produced
victory. Moreover, the German Army would have had to accomplish this shortly after
Prokhorovka as the Stavka ordered those forces fight their way out on July 16 in order to avoid
encirclement.14
The Wehrmacht should have also placed greater emphasis on retaining possession of the
battlefield to recover more damaged vehicles. After previous engagements, the German forces
controlled the battlefields after the fighting and had consequently managed to keep their
13
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available tank strength at a relatively constant level by recovering and repairing damaged
vehicles. In fact, the Germans had returned over 600 damaged tanks back into the fight over the
period of July 5 to 18, so holding the battlefield would have given them the chance to recover or
cannibalize many more.15 Stronger emphasis in this area would have also kept the Red Army
from doing the same thing. Because the Soviets had possessed the battlefields where the
majority of the armor battles had occurred, they were able to double their available tank strength.
Field Marshal von Manstein stated that the Battle of Stalingrad was certainly a turning
point in the war and, grave though the loss of Sixth Army undoubtedly was, it still need not have
meant that the war in the east—and ipso facto the war as a whole—was irretrievably lost. He
thought was conceivable to force a stalemate in the east. This might have been true after the
Battle of Stalingrad, as a German victory at Kursk would have smashed the same Soviet forces
that would later drive to Berlin and, therefore, delayed the Red Army's advance at least until
replacement forces with experienced leaders could have been formed. The magnitude of the
Wehrmacht's defeat at Kursk, however, ended any hope of a stalemate in the east. Therefore, the
assertions of von Manstein and Carell that Hitler's decision to halt the offensive was "throwing
away a victory" are invalid. The Wehrmacht simply could not have salvaged a victory of any
strategic significance at Kursk. In fact, the best the German forces could have accomplished was
to withdraw in a better situation than they did. Operation CITADEL had also depleted the
offensive power of the panzerwaffe to the point that anything short of a massive destruction of
Soviet military forces akin to the Barbarossa encirclement battles could rectify the situation.
Moreover, the Red Army was still numerically superior to the Wehrmacht and had gained valued
experience, improved combat doctrine, improved weapons quality, and increased the quantity of
15
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their weaponry in all areas. Thus, a German victory of a magnitude necessary to regain the
strategic initiative was all but impossible.16

(KOSAVE II), p. 5-14 through 5-15.
16 Heinz Guderian, Panzer Leader, p. 302; Piekalkiewicz, Kursk and Orel, p. 272. There were, however,
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11/12 July. Finally, Hitler should have allowed him a free hand to finish the offensive, as any strategic movement
of units from the Eastern Front could not outweigh the importance of the battle in which these forces were already
engaged. Kursk would still be the last time the panzer divisions were at this level of relative combat power, but the
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